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EQUAL WORK 
STEPHANIE BORNSTEIN* 
 Most Americans have heard of the gender pay gap and the sta-
tistic that, today, women earn on average eighty cents to every dol-
lar men earn.  Far less discussed, there is an even greater racial 
pay gap.  Black and Latino men average only seventy-one cents to 
the dollar of white men.  Compounding these gaps is the “pollut-
ing” impact of status characteristics on pay: as women and racial 
minorities enter occupations formerly dominated by white men, the 
pay for those occupations goes down.  Improvement in the gender 
pay gap has been stalled for nearly two decades; the racial pay 
gap is actually worse than it was thirty-five years ago.  Both pay 
gaps exacerbate growing income inequality in the United States.  
While demographic differences contribute to pay disparities (in 
women’s hours worked and time off for childbearing, and in mi-
nority workers’ education and experience levels), economists now 
find that fully one-third to one-half of both pay gaps is caused by 
two other factors: occupational segregation—meaning the une-
qual distribution of women and racial minorities across job 
fields—and discrimination.  To what extent are these factors due 
to stereotypes about the value of women and racial minorities’ 
work, and what, if anything, can antidiscrimination law do to re-
spond? 
 Existing federal law prohibits sex and race discrimination in 
pay, but requires an employee to provide proof of an employer’s 
intent to discriminate or a nearly identical “comparator” of a dif-
ferent sex or race performing “equal work” who is paid more.  
Current proposals for reform focus on narrowing an employer’s 
defenses in a lawsuit alleging unequal pay.  This approach, while 
likely to improve plaintiffs’ successes in court, misses the forest for 
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the trees.  Leaving the definition of “equal work” untouched in 
threshold requirements for legal protection fails to account for the 
workforce segregation and gender and racial stereotyping at the 
root of much of the current pay gaps. 
 This Article explores how the limitations of existing law allow 
the gender and racial pay gaps to persist and analyzes proposals 
for improvement.  To do so, the Article contrasts current reform 
efforts with alternatives, including the historical movement in the 
1980s for “comparable worth” legislation and its echo in recently 
enacted laws in three states requiring equal pay for “substantially 
similar” or “comparable work.”  Given the difficulty of enacting 
legislative change at the federal level, the Article then proposes a 
reframing of the concept of “equal work” in existing law by draw-
ing on examples of broader definitions used to set pay in some un-
ion, government, and private sector employment contexts.  De-
bunking the outdated criticism that strong equal pay laws force 
employers to “compare apples and oranges” and framing the com-
parison of “equal work” more broadly are essential to overcoming 
the impacts of occupational segregation and stereotyping on pay, 
and to closing the pay gaps. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1950, most biologists were men, as were most designers, ticket 
agents, and recreation workers (park rangers, camp leaders, and the like).1  
By 2000, most workers in each of those occupations were women—and their 
median hourly wages, in real dollars adjusted for inflation, had decreased by 
18% (biologists), 34% (designers), 43% (ticket agents), and 57% (recreation 
workers).2  Meanwhile, the job of computer programmer, a position largely 
held by women in 1950, evolved from glorified typist to prestigious profes-
sional—with a corresponding increase in real median wages—as more men 
entered the field.3 
Most jobs in the U.S. economy are “gendered,” meaning they are per-
formed overwhelmingly by members of one sex and, thereby, associated with 
that gender.4  Most nurses, teachers, and administrative assistants are women; 
                                                 
 1.  See Asaf Levanon et al., Occupational Feminization and Pay: Assessing Causal Dynamics 
Using 1950–2000 U.S. Census Data, 88 SOC. FORCES 865, 875–87 (2009); Claire Cain Miller, As 
Women Take Over a Male-Dominated Field, the Pay Drops, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/upshot/as-women-take-over-a-male-dominated-field-the-
pay-drops.html. 
 2.  Miller, supra note 1. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  See infra Part I.B. 
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most engineers, firefighters, and truck drivers are men.5  Researchers have 
documented steep gender segregation in the U.S. workforce: nearly half of 
all women (or of all men) would have to change jobs in order to achieve 
gender parity.6  Among jobs that require the same education and experience, 
jobs gendered masculine pay more than jobs gendered feminine.7  Of the 
thirty highest paid jobs in the U.S. economy, twenty-six are held mostly by 
men, while twenty-three of the thirty lowest paid jobs are held mostly by 
women.8  And, as the earnings of biologists, designers, ticket agents, and rec-
reation workers over time demonstrate, the entry of women into occupations 
previously held by men has a “polluting” effect9 on wages: when the propor-
tion of women performing a previously male-dominated job increases, wages 
for that job decrease.10 
While the gender pay gap may vary by what is measured and compared, 
economic data consistently shows that there is a gender pay gap, even after 
controlling for all relevant variables—the question is just how large a gap.11  
                                                 
 5.  Traditional and Nontraditional Occupations, WOMEN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
https://www.dol.gov/wb/stats/nontra_traditional_occupations.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2018). 
 6.  See infra note 88 and accompanying text.   
 7.  See Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and 
Explanations 27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21913, 2016), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w21913 (“A sizable literature indicates that female occupations pay 
less than male occupations for workers with similar measured characteristics.” (citing Levanon et 
al., supra note 1)); see also infra Part I.B. 
 8.  See EMILY LINER, THIRD WAY, A DOLLAR SHORT: WHAT’S HOLDING WOMEN BACK 
FROM EQUAL PAY? (2017), http://www.thirdway.org/report/a-dollar-short-whats-holding-women-
back-from-equal-pay. 
 9.  Fifteen years ago, economist Claudia Goldin identified a “pollution theory” to explain 
workplace sex discrimination, whereby men’s discriminatory actions toward women entering their 
field could be viewed “as the consequence of a desire by men to maintain their occupational status 
or prestige.”  Goldin wrote: 
[P]restige can be “polluted” by the entry of an individual who belongs to a group whose 
members are judged on the basis of the group’s average and not by their individual merits.  
Men in an all-male occupation might be hostile to allowing a woman to enter their occu-
pation even if the woman meets the qualifications for entry . . .[because] those in the 
wider society . . . [might] view her entry as signaling that the occupation had been altered.  
She will be seen as “polluting” the occupation. 
Claudia Goldin, A Pollution Theory of Discrimination: Male and Female Differences in Occupa-
tions and Earnings 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8985, 2002), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8985.  Goldin continued: “The pollution theory . . . posits that male 
employees discriminate against prospective female employees as a way of protecting their prestige 
in an asymmetric information context.  Id. at 4.  Here, I adopt Goldin’s language and theory to argue 
that, when women and racial minorities enter occupations previously dominated by white men, there 
is a similar “polluting” effect that results in lower wages.   
 10.  See Lisa Catanzarite, Race-Gender Composition and Occupational Pay Degradation, 50 
SOC. PROBS. 14, 14–18, 30–31 (2003) (describing this phenomenon as pay “erosion” or “degrada-
tion”); Levanon et al., supra note 1, at 868; Miller, supra note 1.  
 11.  See ELISE GOULD ET AL., ECON. POLICY INST., WHAT IS THE GENDER PAY GAP AND IS IT 
REAL? THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO HOW WOMEN ARE PAID LESS THAN MEN AND WHY IT CAN’T 
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Statistics that aggregate unadjusted data show the biggest gap.  In the most 
recent analyses, when comparing the median earnings of all U.S. women and 
men working full-time, women earn $0.80 annually and $0.83 hourly to every 
dollar earned by men.12  As data is adjusted to account for variables such as 
education, work experience, hours worked, and geographic region, the gen-
der pay gap becomes smaller.13  Yet, even among employees performing the 
same job with the same education and experience level, there is a documented 
pay gap between men and women.14 
Much less known and discussed, there is an even greater racial pay gap 
in the U.S. workforce.  Recent studies of unadjusted data comparing median 
earnings for all men show that African American and Latino men earn just 
$0.71 on the dollar to white men.15  When adjusted to control for variables 
like education, experience level, and geographic region, black and Latino 
men’s earnings relative to white men’s rise to between $0.78 and $0.82 on 
the dollar.16  Women of color bear the brunt of both gender and racial pay 
gaps.  In recent data, black women earned between $0.63 and $0.70 on the 
dollar to white men, and $0.81 to $0.88 on the dollar to white women, de-
pending on adjustments.17  The unadjusted median average earnings of Latina 
women were as low as $0.54 on the dollar to white men.18  While occupa-
tional segregation by race is harder to track than by gender, it is still a signif-
icant feature of the U.S. labor market.  A recent study documented that black 
men are represented in proportion to their presence in the labor market in a 
mere 13% of all occupations, and are overrepresented in nearly 40% of lower-
earning jobs and underrepresented in nearly 50% of higher-earning jobs.19 
Economists who study the gender and racial pay gaps in the U.S. work-
force attribute these disparities to a number of causes.  At least half of both 
gaps are attributable to real demographic differences that affect employment 
                                                 
BE EXPLAINED AWAY 1 (2016), http://www.epi.org/publication/what-is-the-gender-pay-gap-and-
is-it-real/ (“The presence of alternative ways to measure the gap can create a misconception that 
data on the gender wage gap are unreliable.  However, the data on the gender wage gap are remark-
ably clear and (unfortunately) consistent about the scale of the gap.  In simple terms, no matter how 
you measure it, there is a gap.”). 
 12.  See infra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.   
 13.  See infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.   
 14.  See infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
 15.  See infra text accompanying notes 67–68.   
 16.  See infra text accompanying note 63. 
 17.  See infra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
 18.  See infra text accompanying note 69. 
 19.  See DARRICK HAMILTON ET AL., ECON. POLICY INST., WHITER JOBS, HIGHER WAGES: 
OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION AND THE LOWER WAGES OF BLACK MEN 3–4 (2011), 
http://www.epi.org/publication/whiter_jobs_higher_wages/; see also Derek Thompson, The Work-
force Is Even More Divided by Race Than You Think, ATLANTIC (Nov. 6, 2013), https://www.theat-
lantic.com/business/archive/2013/11/the-workforce-is-even-more-divided-by-race-than-you-
think/281175/. 
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and earnings.20  For the racial pay gap, the primary demographic difference 
is in human capital factors: workers who are racial minorities have, on aver-
age, lower levels of education and work experience than white workers, 
which leads to lower-paying jobs.21  For the gender pay gap, human capital 
factors no longer represent a significant difference between female and male 
workers due to increases in women’s levels of education and experience since 
the 1950s.22  Instead, the primary demographic difference contributing to the 
gender pay gap is in hours worked: on average, women work fewer hours 
than men and must take more unpaid time off from work for childbearing and 
rearing.23  To reduce the portion of both pay gaps attributable to real work-
force demographic differences requires sustained policy interventions around 
access to education and training, affordable child care, paid family and med-
ical leave, and more—all of which have been explored by other scholars24 
and are beyond the scope of this Article. 
Yet after accounting for the part of the gender and racial pay gaps that 
is due to actual differences in workers’ qualifications or work hours, the part 
that is not the product of these differences remains.  Economists now estimate 
that between one-third and one-half of both current pay gaps is attributable 
to two factors on which this Article focuses: (1) occupational segregation by 
gender and race, and (2) stereotyping and discrimination. 
Since the mid-1960s, two federal laws, and state versions of them in all 
but two states, have explicitly prohibited pay discrimination—Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”)25 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963.26  
Title VII prohibits discrimination in compensation because of sex or race; 
yet, for a plaintiff to prove that they have experienced pay discrimination, 
they must provide evidence of a similarly situated “comparator” outside of 
their race who was paid more.27  The Equal Pay Act also prohibits sex dis-
crimination in compensation and requires employers to provide equal pay for 
                                                 
 20.  See infra text accompanying note 75. 
 21.  See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
 22.  See infra text accompanying note 55. 
 23.  See infra text accompanying notes 77–78. 
 24.  See, e.g., RONALD F. FERGUSON, TOWARD EXCELLENCE WITH EQUITY: AN EMERGING 
VISION FOR CLOSING THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 1–7 (2007); ALYSSA DAVIS & ELISE GOULD, ECON. 
POLICY INST., CLOSING THE PAY GAP AND BEYOND: A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR 
IMPROVING ECONOMIC SECURITY FOR WOMEN AND FAMILIES (2015), http://www.epi.org/publica-
tion/closing-the-pay-gap-and-beyond/; Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 
78 N.C. L. REV. 707, 711 (2000); Michelle A. Travis, Disabling the Gender Pay Gap: Lessons from 
the Social Model of Disability, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 893, 901 (2014). 
 25.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2–e-17 (2012). 
 26.  29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012).  The two states with no laws are Alabama and Mississippi.  See 
infra Part II.C. 
 27.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2–e-17; see also infra Part II.A. 
 586 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:581 
 
“equal work” that “requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility.”28  For a 
female plaintiff to prove a violation of the Equal Pay Act, she must, likewise, 
be able to compare herself to a male comparator performing a nearly identical 
job who received higher pay.29  As interpreted by most federal courts, both 
statutes define the comparisons required to prove a violation narrowly.30  
Such narrow interpretations, this Article argues, have unnecessarily limited 
antidiscrimination law from reaching occupational segregation and stereo-
typing in pay-setting that contribute to the pay gaps. 
While the existence of gender and racial pay gaps is nothing new, recent 
data on both the persistence and the causes of such gaps sheds new light on 
the issue, with two modern implications.  First, current legal approaches to 
closing the pay gap are not enough.  Gender and racial pay gaps have been 
stubbornly persistent for now more than fifty years since federal law first 
prohibited sex and race discrimination in pay.  After shrinking consistently 
since the 1950s, improvement in the gender pay gap stalled around the year 
2000, resulting in no meaningful narrowing of the gender pay gap in nearly 
twenty years.31  The racial pay gap has proven even more intractable: there 
has been no measureable improvement in the racial pay gap today as com-
pared to the same gap in 1979, nearly forty years ago.32  For the up to one-
half of these pay disparities that are the product of workforce segregation and 
discrimination, existing antidiscrimination laws have failed to live up to their 
promise of equal treatment and opportunity in employment regardless of sex 
or race.33 
Second, income inequality in the United States, a topic of recent intense 
political focus, cannot be addressed without also addressing the gender and 
racial pay gaps.  Both pay gaps are key contributors to the increasing distance 
between those at the top and the bottom of the U.S. income spectrum.34  As 
women and racial minorities continue to receive less pay, the differences in 
                                                 
 28.  29 U.S.C. § 206(d); see infra Part II.B. 
 29.  See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); infra Part II.B. 
 30.  See infra Parts II.A. & II.B. 
 31.  See infra text accompanying note 49. 
 32.  See infra text accompanying note 64. 
 33.  Over two decades ago, Yale Law Professor Vicki Schultz identified and examined the per-
sistence of sex and race segregation in the U.S. workforce despite the requirements of antidiscrim-
ination law.  For her germinal work on this issue, responding to the idea that workforce segregation 
reflected women’s choices, see generally Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: 
Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of 
Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990) [hereinafter Schultz, Telling Stories]; Vicki 
Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of 
Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073 (1992).  
See also Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENVER U. L. REV. 995, 996, 
1048–65 (2015) [hereinafter Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously]. 
 34.  See infra Part I.C. 
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economic status between high- and low-wage earners compound exponen-
tially.35  Workforce segregation and discrimination are unfairly depressing 
wages—an economically inefficient trend with costs borne by the entire U.S. 
economy. 
This Article takes a fresh look at the problem of unequal pay and theo-
rizes a new legal framework under existing law to redress it.  To what extent 
are current pay gaps due to stereotypes about the value of women and racial 
minorities’ work, and how can antidiscrimination laws respond?  The Article 
proceeds in four Parts.  Part I provides the most up-to-date data on current 
gender and racial pay gaps in the United States to define the scope of the 
problem.  It also provides related information on occupational segregation 
and income inequality key to understanding both the causes and the impacts 
of persistent unequal pay.  Part II provides a comprehensive discussion of 
existing law prohibiting pay discrimination by sex and race, examining the 
limitations of current interpretations of the law that fail to redress persistent 
gaps.  Part III identifies and analyzes key efforts to strengthen antidiscrimi-
nation protections designed to close the pay gaps, first by looking to the his-
torical movement in the 1980s to interpret federal law as requiring equal pay 
for “comparable worth.”  It then addresses current law reform efforts to ex-
pand equal pay protections at both federal and state levels, with a focus on 
three just-enacted state laws in California, Massachusetts, and Oregon that 
go the furthest toward requiring equal pay for “substantially similar” or 
“comparable work.” 
Lastly, given that legislative change is difficult to achieve, Part IV pro-
poses a reinterpretation of existing antidiscrimination statutes to allow a 
broader framing of comparisons when defining what constitutes “equal 
work.”  It does so by looking to examples in which union, government, and 
even some private sector employers have, themselves, set equal pay across a 
wide array of positions, helping correct unfair pay differences due to occu-
pational segregation.  This Part pushes back on the perennial criticism levied 
against attempts to broaden protections for equal pay that employers should 
not be required to “compare apples and oranges,”36 by showing that not every 
difference between jobs need be wage-determinative.  Many employers are 
                                                 
 35.  See id. 
 36.  For over thirty years, this has been a perennial criticism of equal pay initiatives.  Compare 
S. ANNA KONDRATAS & ELEANOR SMEAL, HERITAGE FOUND., COMPARABLE WORTH: PAY 
EQUITY OR SOCIAL ENGINEERING? (1986), http://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/report/compa-
rable-worth-pay-equity-or-social-engineering (a debate in which a Heritage Foundation Senior Pol-
icy Analyst discounted a supporter of comparable worth’s attempt to prove that you can “compare 
apples and oranges”), with Laura Bassett, Conservatives Push Back Against Equal Pay Efforts, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/07/republicans-equal-
pay_n_5106329.html (in which the executive director of the conservative Independent Women’s 
Forum noted that “comparing men’s and women’s wages is like ‘comparing apples to oranges’”). 
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already making broader comparisons successfully to help create pay equity 
in their own ranks. 
Debates over the size of the gender and racial pay gaps have obscured 
an underlying, and fixable, problem in the limitations of current antidiscrim-
ination law.  Regardless of how large or small the gaps, economists now agree 
that up to one-half of both gender and racial pay gaps are caused by occupa-
tional segregation and discrimination.37  Court interpretations of existing an-
tidiscrimination laws have drawn the lines around what jobs may be com-
pared so narrowly that the law has been unable to reach its full potential to 
redress the problem.38  The time has come to revisit equal pay protections, to 
modernize legal interpretations so as to effectively correct for the operation 
of unlawful bias in pay-setting, and to restart the long-stalled progress toward 
closing the pay gaps. 
I.  DATA AND EXPLANATIONS 
Over nearly half a century, researchers have developed a significant 
body of data on pay gaps.39  Today, economists and social scientists have 
documented both gender and racial pay gaps using a wide array of measures, 
from the most general and aggregated to the most precise and granular.  Crit-
ics of policy interventions to reduce pay gaps often focus on undercutting the 
accuracy of these measurements.40  Yet an overwhelming consensus of reli-
able data now shows that, even after controlling for virtually all relevant var-
iables, gender and racial pay gaps remain.  This Part provides an overview of 
the most recent data on U.S. pay gaps by gender and race, as well as related 
data on income inequality and workforce segregation. 
A.  Measuring the Pay Gaps 
The rate of women’s workforce participation has grown dramatically 
over the past half-century.  In 1948, 32.7% of all women participated in the 
U.S. workforce; by 2016, that number rose to 56.8%, with a high of 60% in 
1999.41  The proportion of the U.S. labor force composed of women rose from 
                                                 
 37.  See infra text accompanying notes 83–86, 106–111. 
 38.  See infra Part III.A. & B. 
 39.  See, e.g., Doris Weichselbaumer & Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, A Meta-Analysis of the Interna-
tional Gender Wage Gap, 19 J. ECON. SURVEYS 479, 479 (July 2005) (citing research “since the 
early 1970s”). 
 40.  See, e.g., STEVEN HORWITZ, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC., TRUTH AND MYTH ON THE 
GENDER PAY GAP (2017), https://fee.org/articles/truth-and-myth-on-the-gender-pay-gap/; Chris-
tina Hoff Sommers, 6 Feminist Myths That Will Not Die, TIME, http://time.com/3222543/wage-pay-
gap-myth-feminism/ (last updated June 17, 2016, 3:20 PM). 
 41.  WOMEN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE BY SEX, 
RACE AND HISPANIC ETHNICITY, 1948–2016 ANNUAL AVERAGES, 
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28.6% in 1948 to 46.8% in 2016.42  Yet despite women’s near equal partici-
pation in the paid workforce today, a persistent gender pay gap remains. 
While the size of the gender pay gap varies depending on what you 
measure, three key principles are consistent across the data.  First, at every 
level of the economy and no matter how many variables for which you con-
trol, there is still a pay gap between men and women—it is just a question of 
a relatively larger or smaller gap.43  Second, improvement in the pay gap has 
been stalled for nearly twenty years.44  Third, when more women are present 
in a field, the average pay is lower.45  There is no female-dominated profes-
sion that, when compared to a male-dominated profession requiring the same 
education and experience, is more highly paid.  As more women enter a pro-
fession, the average pay for that position decreases.46 
The most oft-cited statistic for the gender pay gap aggregates and com-
pares the median pay of all women and men working full time.  Recent data 
shows that, when comparing those engaged in full-time year-round work, 
women earn $0.80 for every dollar earned by men annually.47  When hourly 
wages are compared, allowing part-time workers to be included and adjusting 
for the fact that men may work more hours in a year, women earn on average 
$0.83 to every dollar men earn per hour.48 
After narrowing from the late 1970s through the 1990s, improvements 
in the gender wage gap stalled, and the current 75% to 80% figure has re-
mained relatively stagnant for nearly two decades.49  What gains were made 
by women during this time period were due, in part, to women’s increasing 
levels of education and work experience, and, in part, to stagnation in men’s 
wages.  In fact, the real value of men’s wages have decreased by 6.7% since 
1979, meaning that nearly one-third of women’s gains in narrowing the gen-
der pay gap came from a decline in men’s wages.50  At the current rate of 
                                                 
https://www.dol.gov/wb/stats/NEWSTATS/facts/lf_prate_sex_race_hisp_2016_txt.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 12, 2018). 
 42.  WOMEN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE BY SEX, 1948–2016 
ANNUAL AVERAGES, 
https://www.dol.gov/wb/stats/NEWSTATS/facts/civilian_lf_sex_2016_txt.htm (last visited Mar. 
12, 2018). 
 43.  See infra notes 53–61 and accompanying text. 
 44.  See infra text accompanying notes 49–51. 
 45.  See infra notes 92–96. 
 46.  See infra notes 97–100 and accompanying text. 
 47.  See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE GENDER PAY GAP 4 
(2d ed. 2017), https://www.aauw.org/aauw_check/pdf_download/show_pdf.php?file=The-Simple-
Truth [hereinafter AAUW]; GOULD ET AL., supra note 11, at 1, 5. 
 48.  See GOULD ET AL., supra note 11, at 1, 6.  
 49.  See AAUW, supra note 47, at 4; GOULD ET AL., supra note 11, at 8. 
 50.  See GOULD ET AL., supra note 11, at 9. 
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progress, experts estimate that it will take somewhere between 41 and 101 
years for all U.S. women to achieve equal pay with men.51 
Using the most aggregated statistics to measure the gender pay gap may 
be subject to the criticism that comparing all women to all men masks ra-
tional, nondiscriminatory reasons for disparate pay, such as differences in 
experience, qualifications, or work hours.52  Yet no matter how you slice the 
data, a pay gap remains.53  For example, the pay gap widens as women reach 
prime childbearing years, but it exists long before then, too.  Full-time work-
ing women ages twenty to twenty-four make $0.96 on the dollar to men; those 
ages twenty-five to fifty-four drop to earning between $0.78 and $0.89 on the 
dollar to men.  The gap increases further, to between $0.74 and $0.82 to each 
dollar men earn until age fifty-five, after which the gap remains at around 
$0.74.54  Likewise, while education level generally increases pay, when only 
women and men who have achieved the same level of education are com-
pared, the pay gap becomes even greater, likely because the average female 
worker has more education than the average male worker.55  Women with a 
high school degree earn 78% of what men with a high school degree earn; 
women with a bachelor’s degree earn only 74% of what men with a bache-
lor’s degree earn, as do women with an advanced degree compared to simi-
larly educated men.56  When female and male college graduates’ earnings are 
compared just one year out of college, the female graduates earned only $0.82 
to the dollar of their equally situated male classmates.57  While disaggregat-
ing data and controlling for a variety of variables allow a narrow comparison 
                                                 
 51.  See AAUW, supra note 47, at 4 (estimating that equal pay will not happen until 2059 at 
the earliest or 2119 if current conditions persist). 
 52.  See, e.g., Emily Moore, 5 Things We Still Get Wrong About the Gender Pay Gap, 
GLASSDOOR (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.glassdoor.com/blog/5-things-wrong-gender-wage-gap/; 
Jason Richwine, The Radicalism of ‘Equal Pay Day’, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 9, 2017, 10:40 PM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/446585/equal-pay-day-gender-wage-gap-advocates-radi-
calism; Sommers, supra note 40. 
 53.  See GOULD ET AL., supra note 11, at 1.  
 54.  See AAUW, supra note 47, at 11–12 (citing BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF LABOR, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY ANNUAL AVERAGE DATA TABLES, at tbls.2 & 39 
(2017)); see also GOULD ET AL., supra note 11, at 13. 
 55.  See GOULD ET AL., supra note 11, at 6–7.  
 56.  See AAUW, supra note 47, at 14 fig.6 (citing BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF LABOR, MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS, BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION AND GENDER IN 2016 (2017)); 
GOULD ET AL., supra note 11, at 19. 
 57.  See AAUW, supra note 47, at 13 (citing CHRISTINE CORBETT & CATHERINE HILL, AM. 
ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, GRADUATING TO A PAY GAP: THE EARNINGS OF WOMEN AND MEN ONE 
YEAR AFTER COLLEGE GRADUATION (2012)). 
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of the most similarly situated men and women, doing so also ignores differ-
ences in opportunities and workplace norms that make it harder for women 
to reach that level of similarity in the first place.58 
Even after controlling for nearly all possible quantifiable variables, 
there remains some portion of the gender wage gap that cannot be explained, 
leading researchers to infer discrimination.  One group of economists found 
a 13.5% difference when industry, occupation, and work hours were con-
trolled to model “a man and woman with identical education and years of 
experience working side-by-side in cubicles.”59  In another study, researchers 
controlled for “college major, occupation, economic sector, hours worked, 
months unemployed since graduation, GPA, type of undergraduate institu-
tion, institution selectivity, age, geographical region, and marital status,” and 
still found a gender wage gap of 7% one year after college graduation and 
12% ten years later.60  In yet a third study, researchers found a remaining 
disparity of 8.4% after controlling for not only education, industry, occupa-
tion, experience level, and geography, but also race, ethnicity, and metropol-
itan region.61 
The U.S. economy is also marked by a steep racial pay gap that, while 
less commonly documented than the gender pay gap, is similarly consistent.  
One recent study of pay data from 2015 showed that all black men’s average 
hourly wages were 31% lower than all white men’s.62  After controlling for 
education, experience, and geography, black men earned $0.78 on the dollar 
to white men (a 22% wage gap).63  Most disturbingly, the research showed 
that, except for a brief narrowing in the late 1990s, the racial pay gap between 
                                                 
 58.  See GOULD ET AL., supra note 11, at 2 (“[B]ecause gender wage gaps that are ‘adjusted’ 
for workers’ characteristics (through multivariate regression) are often smaller than unadjusted 
measures, people commonly infer that gender discrimination is a smaller problem in the American 
economy than thought.”).  But using adjusted rates only “misses all of the potential differences in 
opportunities for men and women that affect and constrain the choices they make before they ever 
bargain with an employer over a wage.”  Id.  Thus: 
switching to a fully adjusted model of the gender wage gap actually can radically under-
state the effect of gender discrimination on women’s earnings . . . because gender dis-
crimination doesn’t happen only in the pay-setting practices of employers making wage 
offers to nearly identical workers of different genders.  Instead, it can potentially happen 
at every stage of a woman’s life, from girlhood to moving through the labor market.   
Id. at 7.  
 59.  See GOULD ET AL., supra note 11, at 7 & 36 n.9.  
 60.  See AAUW, supra note 47, at 20 (first citing CORBETT & HILL, supra note 57; and then 
citing J. G. DEY & C. HILL, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., BEHIND THE PAY GAP 
(2007)). 
 61.  GOULD ET AL., supra note 11, at 7 & 36 n.10 (citing Blau & Kahn, supra note 7, at 5).  
 62.  See VALERIE WILSON & WILLIAM M. RODGERS III, ECON. POLICY INST., BLACK-WHITE 
WAGE GAPS EXPAND WITH RISING WAGE INEQUALITY 1, 3 (2016), http://www.epi.org/publica-
tion/black-white-wage-gaps-expand-with-rising-wage-inequality/. 
 63.  See id. at 1. 
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black and white workers has remained stable or increased for nearly forty 
years.64  For black men with at least a college degree in their first ten years 
on the job market, a 10% pay penalty as compared to similar white men in 
the 1980s increased to 20% in 2014.65  Another study confirmed this lack of 
progress in closing the racial pay gap for black men, who “earned the same 
73%” of white men’s earnings in both 1980 and 2015.66  Latino men’s hourly 
earnings as compared to white men’s actually decreased from 71% in 1980 
to 69% in 2015.67  When comparing only college educated workers, black 
and Latino men earn 20% less than similarly-situated white men.68 
Not surprisingly, women of color fare the worst of all U.S. workers, 
experiencing both gender and racial pay gaps.  According to recent aggre-
gated data, Latina women earn only $0.54 annually, $0.58 hourly and African 
American women only $0.63 annually, $0.65 hourly to each dollar earned by 
white men.69  Yet even after controlling for education, experience, and geog-
raphy, women of color’s pay gap remains nearly unchanged.  One study con-
trolling for such factors showed that black women still suffer a 34% pay gap 
when compared with similarly situated white men70; another showed a 30% 
gap in the hourly wages of black and Latina women with a college degree as 
compared to those of “similarly educated white men.”71  Black women are 
also at a disadvantage in earnings as compared to white women.  One study 
reported that all black women’s average hourly wages were 19% lower than 
white women’s,72 and another, with adjusted data, that black women experi-
enced a 12% pay gap when compared to similarly situated white women.73  
Even using these most adjusted data, women of color earn, on average, only 
                                                 
 64.  See id. 
 65.  See id. 
 66.  Eileen Patten, Racial, Gender Wage Gaps Persist in U.S. Despite Some Progress, PEW 
RES. CTR. (July 1, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/01/racial-gender-wage-
gaps-persist-in-u-s-despite-some-progress/; Kirsten Salyer, The Racial Wage Gap Has Not 
Changed in 35 Years, TIME (July 1, 2016), http://time.com/4390212/race-wage-gap-pew-analysis/. 
 67.  Patten, supra note 66. 
 68.  See id.  Asian men now earn, on average, more than white men, with a median hourly wage 
of $24 to white men’s $21.  Id.  For this reason, Asian men’s earnings are not discussed. 
 69.  AAUW, supra note 47, at 11 (providing annual figures from 2016); GOULD ET AL., supra 
note 11, at 13 (providing hourly figures from 2015).  Asian women now earn, on average, more than 
white women, with a median hourly wage of $18 to white women’s $17.  Patten, supra note 66.  For 
this reason, Asian women’s earnings are not discussed separately as they relate to the racial pay 
gap, but are included in the discussion of the overall gender pay gap between women and men. 
 70.  WILSON & RODGERS, supra note 62, at 1, 3–4. 
 71.  Patten, supra note 66. 
 72.  WILSON & RODGERS, supra note 62, at 1.  This statistic is all the more disturbing given 
that the gap between white and black women’s earnings was only 6% in 1979—meaning that this 
gap more than tripled in the past four decades.  Id. at 3. 
 73.  Id. at 4. 
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$0.66 to $0.70 on the dollar of their white male peers and $0.88 on the dollar 
of their white female peers. 
To be sure, a significant portion of the racial pay gap can be explained 
by actual demographic differences in workforce characteristics between 
white and minority workers, including “human capital” factors like education 
and experience levels.  One recent study quantified that one-third of the un-
adjusted racial pay gap was due to “[d]ifferences in . . . education and expe-
rience levels” attained between black and white workers and their resulting 
job opportunities and outcomes.74  Another study, focused on public sector 
workers, estimated that “individual attributes such as human capital” and 
“education and workforce experience” accounted for just over half of the ob-
served racial pay gap.75 
Real demographic differences also contribute to the gender pay gap, pri-
marily in differences between men and women’s working time; today, edu-
cation and experience represent little of the overall gender pay gap for white 
women, although a greater portion for women of color.76  Women are more 
likely to work fewer hours than men: twice as many women work part-time 
as men (one-eighth of men, one-quarter of women), often involuntarily.77  
Women are also more likely to be out of the workforce without pay for some 
period of childbirth, childrearing, or other family caregiving.78  Notably, over 
85% of American women have children by age forty-four.79  Fewer hours or 
months of work impact women’s experience levels, which compounds their 
relative pay disadvantage.80  Women are also more likely to need occupations 
that allow for what Harvard economist Claudia Goldin calls “temporal flexi-
bility,” which tend to pay less; the highest paying jobs in the U.S. economy 
                                                 
 74.  Id. at 3; see also Patten, supra note 66 (reporting that a significant portion of the racial pay 
gap is caused by “differences in education [and] labor force experience”). 
 75.  Eric Grodsky & Devah Pager, The Structure of Disadvantage: Individual and Occupa-
tional Determinants of the Black-White Wage Gap, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 542, 562 (2001); see also 
Patten, supra note 66. 
 76.  See Patten, supra note 66 (noting that the narrowing in the pay gap for all women from 
1980 to 2015 was attributed to increased human capital— “a significant increase in the education 
levels and workforce experience of women over time,” although black ($0.09 improvement) and 
Latina ($0.05 improvement) women still lagged far behind white women ($0.22 improvement) on 
this measure). 
 77.  See GOULD ET AL., supra note 11, at 16 (citing LONNIE GOLDEN, ECON. POLICY INST., 
STILL FALLING SHORT ON HOURS AND PAY: PART-TIME WORK BECOMING NEW NORMAL (2016), 
http://www.epi.org/publication/still-falling-short-on-hours-and-pay-part-time-work-becoming-
new-normal/). 
 78.  See GOULD ET AL., supra note 11, at 15–17. 
 79.  Claire Cain Miller, The U.S. Fertility Rate Is Down, Yet More Women Are Mothers, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/upshot/the-us-fertility-rate-is-down-
yet-more-women-are-mothers.html. 
 80.  See GOULD ET AL., supra note 11, at 14–17. 
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often demand specific and very long hours.81  All of these factors contribute 
to a “motherhood wage penalty,” whereby women who are mothers earn less 
than women without children and all men.82 
The portion of both pay gaps that is due to actual demographic differ-
ences in human capital or working hours is beyond the reach of existing an-
tidiscrimination law and requires greater policy interventions.  What remains 
of the gender and racial pay gaps, however, has been attributed to two major 
causes this Article seeks to address: occupational segregation and discrimi-
nation. 
B.  Segregation and Stereotyping in the U.S. Workforce 
Gender workforce segregation accounts for a significant, and increas-
ing, portion of the current gender pay gap.83  In a 2016 study, Cornell econo-
mists Francine Blau and Lawrence Kahn estimated that industry and occupa-
tional factors now account for 49% of the gender pay gap, responsible for 
nearly twice as much of the pay gap as thirty years ago.84  In contrast, in a 
2014 study, Harvard economist Claudia Goldin documented that the pay gap 
within occupations was greater than the pay gap between occupations, lead-
ing her to conclude that changes to hours requirements and flexibility were 
more important to closing the pay gap than gender workforce integration.85  
Yet, even while suggesting that “what is going on within occupations . . . is 
                                                 
 81.  See Claudia Goldin, A Grand Gender Convergence: Its Last Chapter, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 
1091, 1117 (2014); GOULD ET AL., supra note 11, at 16.  
 82.  GOULD ET AL., supra note 11, at 14.  This portion of the gender wage gap is often attributed 
to women’s “choices” to go into certain fields or to trade flexibility and fewer work hours for money.  
This characterization ignores the fact that, while women may wish to balance work and caregiving, 
they do not “choose” to be economically penalized for doing so.  See, e.g., id. at 3, 7, 21–22; JOAN 
C. WILLIAMS ET AL., “OPT OUT” OR PUSHED OUT?: HOW THE PRESS COVERS WORK/FAMILY 
CONFLICT 36 (2006), http://worklifelaw.org/pubs/OptOutPushedOut.pdf.  Regardless, this bundle 
of issues—hours, inflexible work schedules, and the deterrent effect of both on the fields and indus-
tries women pursue—contributes a significant portion of the wage gap.  See, e.g., Goldin, supra 
note 81, at 1116–17.  Other legal scholars have sought to address these issues, which require signif-
icant and well-documented legal reforms, including pregnancy accommodation, paid family and 
medical leave, part-time parity, workplace flexibility, and reducing stigma to men for family care—
a discussion that is beyond this Article’s focus on antidiscrimination law.  See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, 
Feminism and Workplace Flexibility, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1203, 1215 (2010); Selmi, supra note 24, 
at 711; Travis, supra note 24, at 901.   
 83.  See ARIANE HEGEWISCH & HEIDI HARTMANN, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RES., 
OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION AND THE GENDER WAGE GAP: A JOB HALF DONE 16 (2014), 
https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/wpallimport/files/iwpr-export/publications/C419.pdf; Catan-
zarite, supra note 10, at 14. 
 84.  Blau & Kahn, supra note 7, at 26 (“[W]hile the share of the gender wage gap due to human 
capital (education and experience) has declined noticeably, the share accounted for by locational 
factors like occupation and industry actually increased from 27% of the 1980 gap to 49% of the 
much smaller 2010 gap.”). 
 85.  See generally Goldin, supra note 81. 
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far more important to the gender gap in earnings than is the distribution of 
men and women by occupations,” Goldin still attributed 32–42% of the gen-
der pay gap among college graduates working full-time year-round to the gap 
between occupations.86  As both studies show, greater policy changes around 
working hours and flexibility may be essential to closing the gender pay gap 
entirely; in the meantime, however, a focus on reducing discrimination and 
occupational segregation offers the potential to cut it nearly in half. 
While, like the pay gap itself, gender workforce segregation lessened 
from the 1970s through the 1990s, it, too, has stalled since 2000.87  Segrega-
tion today among jobs and industries by sex appears as intractable as ever: 
recent studies identified that roughly half of all women would have to change 
jobs for the U.S. workforce to be fully integrated by gender.88  In 2012, over 
40% of women and only 5% of men worked in fields in which more than 
75% of the workers were female; over 44% of men and only 6% of women 
worked in fields in which more than 75% were male.89  While the proportion 
of women in professional occupations like managers, lawyers, and doctors 
has grown from less than one-sixth (4%–15%) to more than one-third (32%–
38%) today, many of the most common occupations for men or for women 
have had “remarkably little change” in terms of gender integration over the 
past four decades.90 
This stall has contributed to the persistence of the gender pay gap.  Re-
search suggests that increased integration contributed significantly to the 
gains women made in closing the pay gap between the 1970s and 2000: as 
occupational segregation went down, the gap between women and men’s pay 
narrowed; as integration slowed and then stalled in the 2000s, so too did im-
provement in the gender pay gap.  Indeed, one study estimated that 40% to 
60% of the growth of real wages experienced by women and by black men 
between 1960 and 2008 was due to increases in occupational integration by 
gender and race.91 
When occupations are segregated by gender, women get the short end 
of the stick.  Throughout the U.S. economy, occupations that are female dom-
inated pay less than those that are male dominated that require the same levels 
                                                 
 86.  Id. at 1098; see also GOULD, ET AL., supra note 11, at 20–21. 
 87.  See AAUW, supra note 47, at 17 (citing HEGEWISCH & HARTMANN, supra note 83). 
 88.  See CECILIA L. RIDGEWAY, FRAMED BY GENDER: HOW GENDER INEQUALITY PERSISTS 
IN THE MODERN WORLD 5 (2011); Blau & Kahn, supra note 7, at 27 (51% in 2009, down from 
64.5% in 1970); Youngjoo Cha, Overwork and the Persistence of Gender Segregation in Occupa-
tions, 27 GENDER & SOC’Y 158, 159 (2013).  
 89.  See HEGEWISCH & HARTMANN, supra note 83, at 1. 
 90.  See id. at 2, 4. 
 91.  See Chang-Tai Hsieh et al., The Allocation of Talent and U.S. Economic Growth 42 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18693, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18693. 
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of education and experience.92  Data comparing gender-segregated occupa-
tions mirrors the wage gap itself: on average, the median weekly pay for both 
men and women working in female-dominated occupations, where women 
compose more than half of those in that occupation, is $0.83 on the dollar to 
the average median weekly pay for both men and women working in male-
dominated occupations.93  Even when controlling for required skills and ed-
ucation level, occupations with a greater proportion of female workers usu-
ally pay less than those with fewer female workers.94  Looking at the gender 
distribution among occupations that make up the top and the bottom of the 
earnings in the U.S. workforce brings the data disturbingly to life.  Of the 
thirty jobs in the U.S. economy with the highest pay, twenty-six are held 
mostly by men; only pharmacists, nurse practitioners, physician assistants, 
and physical therapists both have more than a 50% female workforce and 
earn in the top decile of wages.95  On the other hand, twenty-three of the thirty 
lowest paid occupations are held mostly by women; only dishwashers and 
cooks, car cleaners, parking lot attendants, and grounds and agricultural 
workers are both male-dominated fields and in the lowest decile of earn-
ings.96 
Compounding this disparity, data shows that when more women enter a 
particular field or occupation, the pay decreases.97  In a fifty-year longitudinal 
study of U.S. Census data from 1950 to 2000, Stanford sociologists Asaf 
Levanon, Paula England, and their colleagues set out “to assess whether or 
not there is a causal effect in either direction between sex composition and 
pay,” and found “substantial evidence” that lower pay among female-domi-
nated occupations was due to “devaluation of work done by women.”98  As 
the researchers explained, the theory of “devaluation” posits “that decisions 
of employers about the relative pay of ‘male’ and ‘female’ occupations are 
affected by gender bias”: because “[e]mployers ascribe a lower value for the 
work done in occupations with a high share of females,” they “consequently 
set lower wage levels” for those occupations.99  After conducting a long-term 
                                                 
 92.  See AAUW, supra note 47, at 17–18; LINER, supra note 8. 
 93.  LINER, supra note 8. 
 94.  See Levanon et al., supra note 1, at 865 (first citing Philip N. Cohen & Matt L. Huffman, 
Individuals, Jobs, and Labor Markets: The Devaluation of Women’s Work, 68 AM. SOC. REV. 443 
(2003); then citing David A. Cotter et al., All Women Benefit: The Macro-Level Effect of Occupa-
tional Integration on Gender Earnings Equality, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 714 (1997); and then citing 
PAULA ENGLAND, COMPARABLE WORTH: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE (1992)). 
 95.  LINER, supra note 8.   
 96.  Id. 
 97.  See Goldin, supra note 81 and accompanying text (describing the “pollution theory” of 
workplace sex discrimination); Levanon et al., supra note 1, at 886; Miller, supra note 1, at 2. 
 98.  Levanon et al., supra note 1, at 865, 870. 
 99.  Id. at 866. 
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analysis of median hourly wages for full-time workers by occupation—in 
which they controlled for education, experience, race, and geographic region, 
and changes in skills demanded by jobs—the researchers “found substantial 
support” of a consistent trend over time “that increased feminization of oc-
cupations diminishes their relative pay.”100 
Beyond occupational segregation, even among the same field and even 
the very same job, women earn less on average than men and universally 
experience a pay gap.101  In similar types of occupations, for example, car 
and equipment cleaners (90% of whom are male) earn 14% more than house-
cleaners (85% of whom are female).102  Within the same occupation, female 
truck drivers earn 80% of male truck drivers’ pay; female software develop-
ers 83% of male software developers; female financial managers 69% of 
male financial managers.103  Strikingly, even in traditionally feminine fields, 
women earn less than men.  In 2014, female elementary and middle school 
teachers’ median weekly earnings were 87% of what male teachers earned 
($140 less), female registered nurses 90% of what male registered nurses 
earned ($114 less per week), and female administrative assistants 85% of 
male counterparts ($126 less per week), despite the fact that women greatly 
outnumbered men in those positions, holding 80% to 95% of those jobs.104  
In fact, as one study documented, out of 120 occupations analyzed, including 
female-dominated occupations, men earned more than women in 116; the 
exceptions were non-farm product buyers, data entry workers, general office 
clerks, and police patrol officers, all jobs in which women earned the same 
as men.105 
Racial minorities also suffer economic consequences due to occupa-
tional segregation by race.  As with gender, setting aside the portion of the 
                                                 
 100.  Id. at 886.  In their research, Asaf Levanon et al. explain that they: 
…found some evidence for the devaluation view—an effect of earlier female proportion 
on occupations’ later wage rates, even in the presence of controls for experience and 
educational requirements.  When we divided our data into four periods, we saw no dim-
inution of the devaluation effect over time; if anything, it increased (in the 1980s).  This 
argues against the neoclassical equalizing differences view, which predicts no net effect 
of sex composition with adequate controls. 
Id. at 885. 
 101.  See GOULD ET AL., supra note 11, at 20–21; AAUW, supra note 47, at 18. 
 102.  LINER, supra note 8. 
 103.  AAUW, supra note 47, at 18 (citing BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY ANNUAL AVERAGE DATA TABLES tbl.9 (2017)). 
 104.  Traditional Occupations, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR 
https://www.dol.gov/wb/stats/TraditionalOccupations.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2018) (describing 
the 2014 annual averages of “traditional (female-dominated) detailed occupations by women’s share 
of employment and median weekly earnings”); see also AAUW, supra note 47, at 18. 
 105.  LINER, supra note 8 (citing BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, HIGHLIGHTS 
OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS IN 2015, REPORT tbl.2 (2016), , https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/wom-
ens-earnings/2015/home.htm). 
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racial pay gap attributable to human capital and workforce characteristics, up 
to one half remains.  Studies of the causes of the remaining racial pay gap 
attribute it to income inequality and labor market tightening,106 discrimina-
tion,107 and racial workforce segregation.108  One study identified that one-
third of the pay gap between black and white workers could be attributed to 
race discrimination.109  Another study found that, as compared to their pres-
ence in the labor market, black men are disproportionately over-represented 
in 38% of occupations that pay lower wages and disproportionately under-
represented in nearly half of occupations that offer higher pay.110  Still an-
other study quantified this impact, documenting that, depending on the de-
gree of experience required for the job, racial workforce segregation was re-
sponsible for 28% to 41% of the increase in the black-white pay gap between 
1979 and 1985 and 11% to 25% of the increase in the black-white pay gap 
among women between 2000 and 2015.111 
Like gender-based “devaluation,” in a study of both gender and racial 
pay gap trends, researchers documented the phenomenon of “pay erosion” 
over time in occupations that became increasingly dominated by female and 
minority workers, which they attributed to the fact that such workers tend to 
follow white men into occupations.112  In jobs such as clerks, bank tellers, 
bartenders, real estate agents, and advertising agents that were once predom-
inantly filled by white men, pay drops indicated “declining desirability,” 
which was then compounded by “greater visibility” of women and minorities 
in those positions.113  This creates what the researchers describe as the “in-
sidious problem” that “pay deteriorates precisely where subordinate groups 
are concentrated.”114 
Reflecting upon the body of research on the causes of pay gaps, the im-
pact of workforce segregation and stereotyping becomes clear.  First, 
                                                 
 106.  See WILSON & RODGERS, supra note 62, at 1, 4–5; Tanzina Vega, Wage Gap Between 
Blacks and Whites Is Worst in Nearly 40 Years, CNN MONEY (Sept. 20, 2016),  
http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/20/news/economy/black-white-wage-gap/index.html. 
 107.  See Roland G. Fryer, Jr. et al., Racial Disparities in Job Finding and Offered Wages, 56 
J.L. & ECON. 633, 633–37 (2013); see also Patten, supra note 66; WILSON & RODGERS, supra note 
62, at 1, 3–4. 
 108.  See WILSON & RODGERS, supra note 62, at 49–51 & 49 n.21. 
 109.  See Fryer, Jr. et al., supra note 107, at 635; see also Patten, supra note 66; WILSON & 
RODGERS, supra note 62, at 1, 3–4. 
 110.  HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 3; see also Thompson, supra note 19 (“Blacks, who 
make up just 11 percent of the workforce, account for more than a third of home health aides and 
about 25 percent of both security guards and bus drivers—rather low paying jobs.”).  
 111.  WILSON & RODGERS, supra note 62, at 49–51 & 62 n.21; see also Patten, supra note 66. 
 112.  Catanzarite, supra note 10, at 28; see also Goldin, supra note 81 (describing the “pollution 
theory” of sex discrimination). 
 113.  Catanzarite, supra note 10, at 29. 
 114.  Id. at 30. 
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“women’s” work and the work performed by racial minorities is valued less 
than the work performed by white men—and paid accordingly.  Second, 
when women do “men’s” work and when racial minorities do work previ-
ously performed by white workers, they are valued less, despite doing the 
same work. 
C.  Relationship to Income Inequality 
The issue of income inequality—the wide and widening gap in the 
wealth and standard of living between those at the top and bottom of the U.S. 
income spectrum—has garnered much political attention in recent years.115  
Both gender and racial pay gaps contribute to the existence of income ine-
quality in the United States and, left unchecked, stand to magnify its impact. 
In one example of this relationship, research shows that women have 
higher rates of poverty than men due, in part, to the gender wage gap.116  One 
study estimated that, if the gender pay gap was eliminated, the rate of poverty 
among all women would be cut in half.117  The cumulative economic disad-
vantage to women due to the gender pay gap is, itself, quite shocking.  Over 
the course of a lifetime, an average working woman will lose over half a 
million dollars, and the average woman with a college degree $800,000, due 
to the gender pay gap.118  The pay gap also impacts women’s economic se-
curity in retirement as they receive less than men from Social Security and 
other retirement income tied to wages earned while working.119 
Today, a greater proportion of family earnings come from women, and 
single mothers head more families; thus the gender pay gap hurts not just 
women but all families’ economic security.120  Nearly 70% of all women with 
                                                 
 115.  See, e.g., Will Drabold, Read Bernie Sanders’ Speech at the Democratic Convention, TIME 
(July 26, 2016), http://time.com/4421574/democratic-convention-bernie-sanders-speech-transcript/ 
(“This election is about ending the grotesque level of income and wealth inequality that we currently 
experience, the worst it has been since 1928.”).  
 116.  See, e.g., AAUW, supra note 47, at 4 (citing JESSICA L. SEMEGA ET AL., U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2016 (2017) (reporting that, depending 
on age, 11%-13% of women live below the federal poverty line as compared to 8%-10% of men). 
 117.  See HEIDI HARTMANN ET AL., INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RES., HOW EQUAL PAY FOR 
WORKING WOMEN WOULD REDUCE POVERTY AND GROW THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 1 (2014), 
https://iwpr.org/publications/how-equal-pay-for-working-women-would-reduce-poverty-and-
grow-the-american-economy/. 
 118.  GOULD ET AL., supra note 11, at 7 (citing INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RES., STATUS OF 
WOMEN IN THE STATES 50 (2015)).  See generally SUSAN BISOM-RAPP & MALCOLM SARGEANT, 
LIFETIME DISADVANTAGE, DISCRIMINATION AND THE GENDERED WORKFORCE 115–30 (2016) 
(describing the impact of unequal pay over a woman’s lifetime).  
 119.  See AAUW, supra note 47, at 5 (citing JOCELYN FISCHER & JEFF HAYES, INST. FOR 
WOMEN’S POLICY RES., THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE INCOMES OF OLDER 
AMERICANS: DIFFERENCES BY GENDER, AGE, RACE/ETHNICITY, AND MARITAL STATUS (2013)). 
 120.  Id. (“Today, 42 percent of mothers with children under the age of 18 are their families’ 
primary or sole breadwinners. . . .[F]amilies increasingly rely on women’s wages to make ends 
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children under 18 and over 75% of single mothers with children under 18 
now work.121  Mothers’ income is crucial to family economic support: almost 
two-thirds of women bring in at least one-quarter of a family’s income,122 and 
42% of women with minor children are the primary or the only earner in the 
family.123  If working single mothers received equal pay, one study estimates 
that two-thirds would receive an increase in their pay, and their “very high 
poverty rate” would also be cut in half, from 28.7% to 15%.124  This exacts 
societal costs, too, as families in poverty depend on government-supported 
aid like Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (“TANF”).  Another study 
estimated that, if women achieved pay equity, their earnings would amount 
to nearly fifteen times state and federal government expenditures on TANF 
in 2012.125 
Interestingly, the gender pay gap is actually worse among higher-earn-
ing women, although they have also experienced greater improvements in 
narrowing the wage gap over time.126  In 2015, women who earned wages in 
the tenth percentile of earnings earned $0.92 on the dollar to men, while 
women in the ninety-fifth percentile earned only $0.74.127  Yet the fact that 
the floor of the minimum wage keeps lower-paid women’s pay on more equal 
footing with men is likely of little consolation to those at the tenth percentile, 
who earned less than approximately $19,000 in 2015128—an income level at 
which $0.08 on the dollar is sorely missed.  As one study showed, removing 
the gender pay differential for women who perform lower-skilled occupa-
tions would increase their annual pay by about $6000 to $7000—as the re-
                                                 
meet.” (citing SARAH JANE GLYNN, BREADWINNING MOTHERS ARE INCREASINGLY THE U.S. 
NORM, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (2016), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/re-
ports/2016/12/19/295203/breadwinning-mothers-are-increasingly-the-u-s-norm/)).  
 121.  A SNAPSHOT OF WORKING MOTHERS, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. 1 (2017), 
https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/A-Snapshot-of-Working-Mothers.pdf. 
 122.  AAUW, supra note 47, at 5 (63% in 2012). 
 123.  Id. (citing Glynn, supra note 120). 
 124.  HARTMANN ET AL., supra note 117, at 1. 
 125.  See id.  Another concern is the ability to repay student debt: because women earn roughly 
three-quarters of what men earn with their same level of education, women’s ability to repay student 
debt is correspondingly lessened, and women remained saddled with student debt for longer periods 
of time.  For example, in one study of 2007–2008 college graduates, men had paid off 44% of their 
student debt five years later, while white women had paid off only 33%—African American and 
Hispanic women paid off less than 9%.  See AAUW, supra note 47, at 16 fig.8 (citing AAUW data 
analysis from U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., BACCALAUREATE AND BEYOND LONGITUDINAL STUDY 
2008/12 (2015)). 
 126.  See GOULD ET AL., supra note 11, at 10–11; HEGEWISCH & HARTMANN, supra note 83, at 
14–15. 
 127.  GOULD ET AL., supra note 11, at 10–11.  
 128.  Elka Torpey, Business Careers with High Pay, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STAT. (Aug. 
2016), https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2016/article/mobile/high-paying-business-careers.htm.  
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searchers note, pay differences “of [a] magnitude…enough to make the dif-
ference between above-poverty and below-poverty family living stand-
ards.”129  Where there has been improvement in narrowing the wage gap over 
time, it has been felt more strongly by women at higher income levels.  As 
one study showed, between 1979 and 2015, women in the ninetieth percentile 
of earnings (earning over $92,000 in 2015)130 gained $0.11 on the dollar to 
similarly earning men (from $0.63 in 1979 to $0.738 in 2015 on the dollar), 
while women in the tenth percentile gained only $0.05 during the same time 
period (from $0.869 to $0.92 on the dollar).131 
The racial pay gap is also exacerbating the problem of income inequality 
by race.  One study documented the shocking statistic that the average Afri-
can-American household has a mere 6%, and Latino household 8%, of the 
wealth of the average white family.132  While median annual incomes are 
closer—white families average $50,400 as compared to $32,038 for black 
and $36,840 for Latino families annually—the wide disparity in overall 
wealth is attributed in large part to labor market differences.133  Because fam-
ilies of color are paid less on the dollar, their relative wealth is always less.  
As one of the study’s authors explained: “If you are facing a wealth gap of 
80 cents for every dollar a white family makes, that makes you 20% less able 
to put that dollar into savings, because you may need all of those dollars to 
fill your consumption needs.”134  If racial wage gaps were eliminated, the 
researchers estimated, “median Black wealth would grow $11,488” and 
“[m]edian Latino wealth would grow $8,765,” shrinking the wealth gap rel-
ative to white families by 11% (Black) and 9% (Latino).135  Further, if the 
return on that income were made equal—meaning the ability to save or invest 
at similar rates, rather than having to spend more to cover the same basic 
needs—“median Black wealth would grow $44,963 and median Latino 
wealth would grow $51,552,” closing the wealth gap with white families by 
43% (Black) and 50% (Latino).136 
                                                 
 129.  See HEGEWISCH & HARTMANN, supra note 83, at 19. 
 130.  Torpey, supra note 128.  
 131.  GOULD ET AL., supra note 11, at 10–11.  
 132.  See LAURA SULLIVAN ET AL., THE RACIAL WEALTH GAP: WHY POLICY MATTERS 7 
(2015), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/RacialWealthGap_1.pdf; see also 
Laura Shin, The Racial Wealth Gap: Why a Typical White Household Has 16 Times the Wealth of 
a Black One, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2015/03/26/the-ra-
cial-wealth-gap-why-a-typical-white-household-has-16-times-the-wealth-of-a-black-
one/#307ffa5f1f45. 
 133.  SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 132, at 1–6, 24–31.  The other major causes of the wealth 
disparity are differences in homeownership rates and education levels.  Id. 
 134.  Shin, supra note 132. 
 135.  SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 132, at 3.  
 136.  Id. 
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To the extent that law and policymakers wish to remedy income ine-
quality, the gender and racial pay gaps are an essential cause of, and exacer-
bating factor to, the problem. 
II.  EXISTING LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
For over fifty years, federal law has prohibited pay discrimination 
through both civil rights (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)137 and 
wage and hour (the Equal Pay Act of 1963)138 approaches.  Since then, all but 
two states (Alabama and Mississippi) have enacted their own versions of both 
laws, either mirroring federal protections or going further to enact more strin-
gent requirements.139  Despite major advances in equal opportunity and in-
creased earnings for women and racial minorities, five decades of legal pro-
tection have yet to close the gender and racial pay gaps.  This Part provides 
an overview of existing protections against pay discrimination under federal 
and state law and identifies the limitations that have hampered efforts to 
achieve pay equity. 
A.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
The main federal antidiscrimination law prohibiting discrimination in 
employment, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), includes 
specific protections against pay discrimination.140  Title VII prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex or religion in hir-
ing, firing, terms and conditions of employment, and “compensation.”141  Un-
der Title VII, “compensation” includes not only wages but also benefits, 
commissions, and other financial incentives and rewards attached to employ-
ment.142 
                                                 
 137.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2–e-17 (2012). 
 138.  29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012). 
 139.  See infra Part II.C. 
 140.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).   
 141.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
 142.  U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N COMPLIANCE MANUAL, SECTION 10: 
COMPENSATION DISCRIMINATION n.13 (2000), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/compensa-
tion.html#N_13 (“‘Compensation’ [under Title VII] has the same meaning as ‘wages’ under the 
EPA” and includes “wages, salary, overtime pay; bonuses; vacation and holiday pay; cleaning or 
gasoline allowances; hotel accommodations; use of company car; medical, hospital, accident, life 
insurance; retirement benefits; stock options, profit sharing, or bonus plans; reimbursement for 
travel expenses, expense account, [or other] benefits.”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1620.12(a) (“The term 
wage ‘rate,’ as used in the EPA . . . is considered to encompass all rates of wages whether calculated 
on a time, commission, piece, job incentive, profit sharing, bonus, or other basis.”). 
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An individual who believes they were paid less than their coworkers 
“because of” sex or race can bring a Title VII claim under an individual dis-
parate treatment theory of liability.143  Under the proof structure articulated 
by the Supreme Court in early case law interpreting Title VII, the employee 
must make out a prima facie case of discrimination by alleging that they were 
qualified and performing satisfactorily at the job and experienced an adverse 
employment action (here, being paid too little) under circumstances giving 
rise to an inference of discrimination.144 
Two parts of this prima facie case pose challenges for individuals alleg-
ing race or sex discrimination in pay.  First, because employees rarely discuss 
their pay with each other and are often actively discouraged from doing so, it 
may be hard for individuals to discover, let alone prove, that they are being 
paid less than male or white coworkers.145  In response to this problem, in 
2009 Congress and President Obama enacted the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay 
Act,146 which made clear that the usually short statute of limitations for filing 
a Title VII claim would restart every time a paycheck that was infected with 
prior discrimination was received, so that an employee could sue for pay dis-
crimination at any point at which she discovers it.147  Lilly Ledbetter did not 
discover that she was being paid 25% to 40% less than her similarly-situated 
male coworkers until nearly twenty years after her pay was set, when some-
one left her an anonymous note tipping her off.148  As discussed in Part III 
below, current state and federal legislative proposals would add a require-
ment of “pay transparency” to existing laws, requiring employers to provide 
information on firm-wide pay.149  This could have the effect of both strength-
ening employees’ ability to enforce existing law and forcing employers to, 
themselves, track and voluntarily correct unfair pay in their organizations.150  
Without these advancements, however, most workers may never discover 
their own pay disparities. 
                                                 
 143.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer . . . to  . . . discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”). 
 144.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 145.  See, e.g., Sarah Lyons, Why the Law Should Intervene to Disrupt Pay-Secrecy Norms: An-
alyzing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act Through the Lens of Social Norms, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 361, 373–77 (2013). 
 146.  Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).  
 147.  Id. at 5–6.  
 148.  See Heidi Brown, Equal Payback for Lilly Ledbetter, FORBES (Apr. 28, 2009), 
https://www.forbes.com/2009/04/28/equal-pay-discrimination-forbes-woman-leadership-
wages.html. 
 149.  See infra Parts III.B. & III.C. 
 150.  See infra Parts III.B. & III.C. 
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Second, to create an inference of discrimination to establish a prima fa-
cie case under Title VII, most courts require a plaintiff employee to provide 
evidence of a similarly-situated “comparator” outside of their protected class 
(for example a male employee for a sex claim, a white employee for a race 
claim) who was paid more than the plaintiff.151  The statutory text of Title 
VII makes no mention of this evidence, what has been called the “comparator 
requirement.”152  In early case law interpreting Title VII, the Supreme Court 
suggested that evidence of a comparator would be “[e]specially relevant” in 
creating an inference of discrimination.153  As scholars have noted, many 
lower courts have consistently misinterpreted this dicta as requiring compar-
ator proof,154 and in the context of pay discrimination claims, a nearly iden-
tical comparator who was paid more than the plaintiff.155  As a result, an em-
ployee alleging pay discrimination who cannot point to someone in the same 
exact position with the same exact credentials will have a difficult time suc-
ceeding in a Title VII case at the prima facie stage.156 
Moreover, should the plaintiff succeed in making out a prima facie case 
to create a presumption of pay discrimination, the defendant employer can 
respond by providing a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the pay dis-
parity to rebut the presumption of discrimination.157  Here, too, the law pro-
vides a chance for the employer to explain away any pay differential by high-
lighting any differences in the plaintiff’s background, credentials, 
experience, or job duties or responsibilities, no matter how small.  The plain-
tiff has a chance to respond that the employer’s justification is merely a pre-
text for the real reason behind the pay disparity, sex or race discrimination.158  
But unless the plaintiff can prove that the employer’s explanation is either 
inaccurate or far too insignificant to justify the pay differential, the employer 
will likely prevail. 
                                                 
 151.  See Stephanie Bornstein, Unifying Antidiscrimination Law Through Stereotype Theory, 20 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 919, 944–45 (2016). 
 152.  Id. at 944–45. 
 153.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). 
 154.  See, e.g., Bornstein, supra note 151, at 944–45; Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by 
Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 745 (2011); Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts’ Misuse of the Simi-
larly Situated Concept in Employment Discrimination Law, 67 MO. L. REV. 831, 839 (2002).  But 
see Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 
ALA. L. REV. 191, 203 (2009) (addressing that at least one court has rejected comparator proof as 
necessary, but still noting the relevance of comparators). 
 155.  See Bornstein, supra note 151, at 944–45. 
 156.  See id. 
 157.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 801 (noting in a failure to rehire case,  em-
ployee’s participation in unlawful conduct sufficed as employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory 
reason). 
 158.  Id. at 804.  
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Case law applying Title VII’s individual disparate treatment proof struc-
ture to pay discrimination claims demonstrates the limitations of the law: to 
prevail, a plaintiff must either have some sort of “smoking gun” proof of in-
tent to pay the plaintiff less or a nearly identical comparator who is paid more.  
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held 
that a female accountant who served as the County Fiscal Officer on an in-
terim basis could not use as a Title VII comparator the male employee hired 
for the position permanently, despite their significant overlap in duties and 
educational background.159  In another case, the Tenth Circuit held that a fe-
male jewelry department market analyst who performed similar duties as 
male assistant product managers in the furniture and electronics departments 
could not use them as comparators because the departments “[did] not con-
tribute equally to [the employer’s] revenues.”160  Indeed, federal courts have 
held that a variety of employer explanations are legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reasons for pay disparities to defeat plaintiffs’ Title VII claims, including ex-
planations that arguably perpetuate stereotyping or past discrimination.  For 
example, under Title VII, courts have excused pay differentials based in part 
on employees’ prior salaries161—which could, in effect, excuse an employer 
who pays a black worker less than a white worker with the same credentials 
performing the same job because the black worker earned less at their last 
job.162 
In addition to individual claims, Title VII allows employees to allege 
pay discrimination on a group-wide basis either as a “pattern or practice” 
claim of disparate treatment—meaning that an employer paid a group of em-
ployees discriminatorily less—or as a disparate impact claim163—meaning 
some seemingly neutral employer practice or policy results in a dispropor-
tionately lower pay to one group by sex or race, despite no intent on behalf 
of the employer.164  In both claims, plaintiffs must use statistics and anecdotal 
                                                 
 159.  See Johnson v. Weld Cty., 594 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2010).  The court focused on his ad-
ditional years of experience and some additional duties.  Id. at 1215. 
 160.  Sprague v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1363 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Sprague v. 
Thorn Ams., Inc., No. 93-1478-PFK, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19403, at *6 (D. Kan. Dec. 18, 1995)).  
In part because the departments of her comparators (electronics and furniture/appliances) brought 
in 45% and 50% of store revenue, while her department (jewelry) only 4%, this was a “legitimate 
basis for the difference in pay” to defeat the plaintiff’s prima facie case of Title VII pay discrimina-
tion.  Id.  
 161.  See, e.g., Noel v. Medtronic Electromedics, Inc., 973 F. Supp. 1206, 1213 (D. Colo. 1997) 
(noting, as part of the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for a pay disparity, that the 
male comparators “were paid in accordance with what they had been paid in the past and they each 
maintained part of their previous positions”). 
 162.  See id.  Prior salary has also been held to justify pay differentials under the Equal Pay Act, 
a practice scholars have identified as perpetuating past discrimination.  See infra notes 190–191. 
 163.  See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. 
v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 310 (1977). 
 164.  See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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evidence to prove a prima facie case of a statistically significant disparity in 
pay that, again, creates an inference of discrimination.165  Should the plain-
tiffs succeed in doing so, the defendant employer then raises its defense.  In 
a pattern or practice claim, the employer would either rebut the statistical 
disparity to defeat the plaintiffs’ proof or offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reason for the disparity, similar to the defense in an individual claim.166  In a 
disparate impact case, the employer has a different burden; it must prove that 
the practice or policy that the plaintiffs allege is creating a disparate impact 
in pay is justified as job-related and consistent with business necessity.167 
As in individual disparate treatment claims, in class actions, courts have 
also upheld employer pay policies that may be infected with stereotyping or 
perpetuate past discrimination.  For example, courts have held that setting 
wages according to what the labor market will allow constitutes neither a 
pattern or practice nor a disparate impact claim of pay discrimination under 
Title VII168—which could, in effect, excuse an employer who pays female 
workers less than male workers with the same credentials performing the 
same job solely because the female workers were willing to accept less 
pay.169 
There is no doubt that, in the five decades since its passage, Title VII 
has helped to root out clear pay disparities among nearly identical employees 
and to strike down obviously discriminatory pay policies.170  Beyond that, 
however, the ability of Title VII to redress the gender or racial pay gap has 
been stunted by overly narrow court interpretations of proof requirements as 
applied to pay discrimination.  The very high bar for proof required to create 
an inference of pay discrimination, combined with the very wide berth given 
to employer justifications for any disparities has severely limited Title VII’s 
ability to reach the more complex and structural causes of the gender and 
racial pay gaps. 
                                                 
 165.  See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339; Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 313 (Brennan, J., concurring); 
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. 
 166.  See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 342 n.24; Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 312. 
 167.  See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 435–36. 
 168.  See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps. v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1407 
(9th Cir. 1985) (excusing pay differential based on “prevailing market rates”). 
 169.  See id.  This so-called “market defense” has also been held to justify pay differentials under 
the Equal Pay Act, a practice scholars have identified as perpetuating past discrimination.  See infra 
notes 192–193. 
 170.  See, e.g., Barrett v. Forest Labs., Inc., 39 F. Supp. 3d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding for 
Title VII plaintiffs where pharmaceutical company set base pay lower for female than for male 
employees and refused to pay bonuses to anyone who took six weeks of leave, which had a disparate 
impact on employees needing maternity leave); Sharpe v. Global Sec. Int’l, 766 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 
1272 (S.D. Ala. 2011) (holding that employer failed to offer a legitimate, non-race based reason for 
paying a white coworker more than the black plaintiff). 
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B.  Equal Pay Act of 1963 
In addition to Title VII, a second federal law prohibits sex—but not 
race—discrimination in pay, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (“EPA”).171  Passed 
the year before Title VII, the EPA targeted only sex discrimination in pay 
using a different approach.  While Title VII is codified as a general antidis-
crimination law that, for the most part, requires an employee to prove an em-
ployer’s intent to discriminate,172 the EPA was codified as a wage and hour 
statute with which employers must comply.  This means that, should a plain-
tiff meet the statutory text of the EPA, the employer will be held liable for 
the violation, regardless of the employer’s intent, unless it can prove an af-
firmative defense.173  As such, the EPA provides a potentially powerful sec-
ond tool in federal law with which employees can challenge sex discrimina-
tion in pay. 
Yet, like Title VII, excessively narrow court interpretation of the text of 
the EPA has limited its ability to reach beyond the most egregious cases of 
unequal pay.  To prevail in an EPA case, an individual plaintiff must make 
out a prima facie case that they meet the statutory definition of being paid 
unequal wages for “equal work” as defined.174  Should the plaintiff succeed, 
the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer defendant to raise one of sev-
eral possible affirmative defenses that would excuse the wage differential 
from constituting sex discrimination.175  Collective actions can be brought by 
groups of plaintiffs under the EPA, too; the proof structure largely mirrors 
the individual EPA claim.176 
Two pieces of the EPA present hurdles to plaintiffs.  First, the statute 
defines sex discrimination in pay as paying women and men “within any es-
tablishment” different wages “for equal work on jobs the performance of 
                                                 
 171.  29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012). 
 172.  See, e.g., Loyd v. Phillips Bros., Inc., 25 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 1994) (“What must be 
shown [under Title VII] is quite specific . . . .  There must be an intent to discriminate, and the intent 
must encompass an actual desire to pay women less than men because they are women.”).  Cases 
alleging disparate impact under Title VII do not require proof of discriminatory “intent,” but require 
plaintiffs to make out a prima facie case of statistically significant discrimination before the em-
ployer will be required to raise a defense.  See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).  
 173.  29 U.S.C. § 206(d); see Lenihan v. Boeing Co., 994 F. Supp. 776, 797–98 (S.D. Tex. 1998) 
(“Unlike an EPA claim . . . to prevail on a wage discrimination claim under Title VII, the plaintiff 
must prove that the employer acted with discriminatory intent,” and, unlike a Title VII claim, “if 
the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case [under the EPA], the burdens of production 
and persuasion shift to the employer to demonstrate as an affirmative defense that the difference in 
wages is justified by one of the exceptions specified under the Act.”). 
 174.  Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 175.  See id. at 107–08. 
 176.  See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012); Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 194–96 
(1974) (describing burdens in collective actions). 
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which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are per-
formed under similar working conditions.”177  In regulations and cases further 
defining these terms, to be in the same “establishment” means the same “dis-
tinct physical place of business rather than [the] entire business or ‘enter-
prise’”—that is, “each physically separate place of business is ordinarily con-
sidered a separate establishment.”178  Such interpretation may exclude all but 
the narrowest focus on pay to workers in the same office of even a large, 
national employer.  Also, to perform under “similar working conditions” 
means in the same “surroundings” and with the same “hazards,” including 
physical hazards that are “regularly encountered” in “frequency,” and “se-
verity” of potential injuries, but excludes hours worked and the notion of 
“shift differentials.”179  Most directly tied to gender wage gap data, while one 
federal court held that a woman doing the exact same job as a man, just on a 
part-time basis, should be paid a proportionate salary based on the same 
hourly wage,180 another court disagreed,181 interpreting the law in a way that 
amplifies the cost to women for caregiving, a known significant contributing 
factor to the gender wage gap. 
But it is the definition of “equal work” that, perhaps, most limits the 
statute’s ability to close the gender wage gap.182  As interpreted in the EPA’s 
regulations, to constitute “equal work” in a given case “does not require that 
compared jobs be identical, only that they be substantially equal.”183  Yet 
being “substantially equal” has been interpreted by most federal courts to be 
something more than substantially similar or comparable.184  Indeed, several 
federal courts have described this standard as requiring that, while not iden-
tical, jobs must be “virtually identical” to meet the standard of “equal 
work.”185  Thus courts applying the “equal work” standard have held that, for 
                                                 
 177.  29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).  
 178.  29 C.F.R. § 1620.9(a) (2012); see, e.g., Lenihan, 994 F. Supp. at 797 (analyzing how to 
interpret “establishment” in the EPA). 
 179.  29 C.F.R. § 1620.18(a) (2012); see Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 204 (holding that 
shift differentials do not themselves violate the EPA). 
 180.  See Lovell v. BBNT Sols., LLC, 295 F. Supp. 2d 611, 620–21 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
 181.  See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Altmeyer’s Home Stores, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 201, 
214 (W.D. Pa. 1987). 
 182.  See generally Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass Ceil-
ing, 63 SMU L. REV. 17 (2010) (surveying EPA case decisions) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Shattering]. 
 183.  29 C.F.R. § 1620.13(a) (2017).  
 184.  Compare id., with state law standards discussed infra Parts II.C. & III.C. 
 185.  E.g., Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 238 (5th Cir. 1973) (“When Congress 
enacted the Equal Pay Act, it substituted the word ‘equal’ for ‘comparable’ to show that ‘the jobs 
involved should be virtually identical, that is, they would be very much alike or closely related to 
each other.’  The restrictions in the Act were meant ‘to apply only to jobs that are substantially 
identical or equal.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting 109 CONG. REC. 9, 197 (1963))); Cohens v. Md. 
Dep’t of Human Res., 933 F. Supp. 2d 735, 747 (D. Md. 2013) (“To establish a prima facie case 
 2018]  EQUAL WORK 609 
 
example, a county’s female Director and Deputy Director of the Emergency 
Services Department could not compare themselves to the male directors and 
deputy directors of other county departments who earned on average 20% 
more because of differences between the departments—despite the fact that 
all performed similar managerial tasks.186  Likewise, a female employee who 
earned $11.50 per hour as a lead person/service writer for a trucking company 
was not performing “equal work” to a male lead person who earned $16 per 
hour because of his greater experience, despite the fact that she sometimes 
covered his shifts.187  As a consequence, the EPA as currently interpreted has 
virtually no ability to reach the issue of occupational segregation that drives 
much of today’s gender pay gap. 
The second piece of the EPA that greatly limits its efficacy is the broad 
language providing an employer’s affirmative defense to liability.  Under the 
statute, an employer’s wage differential is excused where the employer can 
show that it was “based on any factor other than sex.”188  Thus even if a 
plaintiff can succeed in making out a prima facie case that she meets the nar-
row statutory definition of “equal work” codified in the statute’s threshold 
requirements, an employer may still defeat her claim by proving another jus-
tification for the pay differential.189  This defense functions in much the same 
way as the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason phase of Title VII disparate 
treatment.  In fact, Congress specifically passed the Bennett Amendment190 
to align the two statutes by clarifying that anything lawful under the EPA was 
also lawful under Title VII.191  Cases interpreting this defense have taken a 
similarly deferential stance to permitting employer justifications, even if they 
are correlated with sex or perpetuate sex discrimination.  For example, fed-
eral courts have held that the “market value” of the job, an employee’s prior 
salary, and “management potential” could all constitute “factors other than 
sex” under the EPA,192 despite the fact that each of these justifications may 
                                                 
under the EPA . . . the plaintiff must show that the jobs in question were ‘virtually identical.’” (quot-
ing Galarraga v. Marriot Emps. Fed. Credit Union, No. JFM-94-1986, 1996 WL 376408, at *3 (D. 
Md. Apr. 24, 1996))). 
 186.  See Wheatley v. Wicomico Cty., 390 F.3d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 187.  See Parada v. Great Plains Int’l of Sioux City, Inc., 483 F. Supp. 2d 777 (N.D. Iowa 2007). 
 188.  29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv) (2012).  
 189.  See Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 107–08 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 190.  Bennett Amendment, Pub. L. 88-352, tit. VII, § 703(h), 78 Stat. 257 (1964).  
 191.  Id. 
 192.  See Brickey v. Emp’rs Reassurance Corp., 293 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1233 (D. Kan. 2003) 
(citing Varley v. Superior Chevrolet Auto. Co., 1997 WL 161942, at *11 (D.Kan. Mar.21,1997), 
EEOC v. Aetna Ins. Co., 616 F.2d 719, 726 (4th Cir.1980); Horner v. Mary Inst., 613 F.2d 706, 714 
(8th Cir.1980)).  But see Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1988) (sug-
gesting that “prior salary alone cannot justify [a] pay disparity” without other differences). 
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be sex-linked.193  This enormous defense limits the ability of the EPA to reach 
the portion of the pay gap created by gender stereotyping and implicit bias, 
including where courts fail to recognize the gender bias built into many fac-
tors an employer may argue are “other than sex.” 
As currently interpreted by federal courts, then, the Equal Pay Act, like 
Title VII, usually reaches only the most overt and narrow forms of gender 
pay discrimination.  Where the EPA’s strict liability approach offers plain-
tiffs the advantage over Title VII of not having to prove an employer’s dis-
criminatory intent, the language of the Act itself and, more importantly, the 
narrowness of courts’ interpretation of it, has hamstrung the EPA from living 
up to its promise of prohibiting unequal pay. 
C.  State Law 
Beyond federal law, all but a handful of states have enacted their own 
versions of federal laws prohibiting race or sex discrimination in compensa-
tion.194  While some state civil rights laws are broader than Title VII in terms 
of their coverage (for example by applying to smaller employers or including 
additional protected classes),195 courts applying state laws generally mirror 
the proof structure of Title VII for proving sex or race discrimination in com-
pensation.196  Thus, the limitations of Title VII to reach issues causing the 
current pay gap described previously apply similarly to state antidiscrimina-
tion laws. 
                                                 
 193.  See Paula A. Monopoli, The Market Myth and Pay Disparity in Legal Academia, 52 IDAHO 
L. REV. 867, 870, 870 n.9 (2016) (describing how, regarding this “fourth affirmative defense” in 
the EPA, “scholars have questioned the assumption that the market is in fact free from bias,” and 
have “made an empirical case that using market-based factors like prior salaries and competing 
offers is infected with the bias that existed when those prior salaries were set or those competing 
offers were formulated.”); Deborah Brake, Reviving Paycheck Fairness: Why and How the Factor-
Other-Than-Sex Defense Matters, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 889, 908–12 (2016).  See generally Nicole 
Buonocore Porter & Jessica R. Vartanian, Debunking the Market Myth in Pay Discrimination Cases, 
12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 159 (2011); Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A 
Market-Based Approach to Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951 (2011) [hereinafter Eisen-
berg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine]; Sharon Rabin-Marglioth, The Market Defense, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. 
L. 807 (2010); Martha Chamallas, The Market Excuse, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 579 (2001). 
 194.  See State Equal Pay Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 23, 2016), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/equal-pay-laws.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 
2018); State Employment-Related Discrimination Statutes, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES 
(July 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/employ/Discrimination-Chart-2015.pdf. 
 195.  See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12900 (West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 378-1–2 
(LexisNexis 2016).  
 196.  See, e.g., Reno v. Baird, 957 P.2d 1333, 1337 (Cal. 1998) (“Because the antidiscrimination 
objectives and relevant wording of…Title VII. . . are similar to those of the FEHA, California courts 
often look to federal decisions interpreting these statutes for assistance in interpreting the FEHA.” 
(citation omitted) (quoting Janken V. GM Hughes Elecs., 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 66 (1996))). 
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Likewise, about half (twenty-four) of the states’ equal pay laws use the 
same language as the federal EPA, both in defining “equal work” and estab-
lishing an employer defense of “any factor other than sex.”197  In these states, 
and two that have no state equal pay law (Alabama and Mississippi), because 
the text is the same as the Equal Pay Act itself, courts apply similar defini-
tions and case law.198  Thus, the limitations of the EPA discussed previously 
also apply to these states’ laws.199 
In contrast, as detailed in the Table, below, in the other near half 
(twenty-four) of states, state versions of equal pay laws differ in some mate-
rial way that allow the possibility for broader reach than the federal EPA.200  
Of those states’ laws, eight have unique language defining the nature of the 
comparison that must be made.  Instead of “equal work” requiring “equal 
skill, effort, and responsibility,” these states require “the same quantity and 
quality of the same classification of work” (Arizona, Missouri),201 “the same 
or substantially similar work” (Illinois, Louisiana),202 or men and women to 
be “similarly employed” (Michigan, Washington).203  In addition, two states 
have laws applying to public sector workers only that require “equivalent 
service” or “the same amount or class of work” (Montana) or “the same kind, 
grade, and quantity of service” (Texas).204  In those eight states, courts in two 
                                                 
 197.  State law data as of February 2018, compiled by the author’s original research using 
Westlaw and Lexis and by reference to State Equal Pay Laws, supra note 194. 
 198.  See supra note 197. 
 199.  See supra Part II.B. 
 200.  This Part and the Table include information on all fifty states’ equal pay acts that apply to 
private sector workers, as well as three state statutes (in Iowa, Texas, and Montana) that provide 
broader protections for public sector workers.  Note, however, that this discussion does not include 
efforts, beginning in the 1980s, in several states to undertake comparable worth studies in the public 
sector, or to adopt comparable worth pay scale plans for public sector workers.  See, e.g., MINN. 
STAT. § 43A.01 (2016); Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Robert S. Smith, Comparable Worth in in the Pub-
lic Sector, in PUBLIC SECTOR PAYROLLS 243–90 (David A. Wise, ed. 1987), 
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7156.  A discussion of state public sector comparable worth studies 
or pay scale plans is beyond the scope of this Article’s focus on judicial interpretation of statutes 
creating private rights of action.   
 201.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-340, 341 (2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.410 (West 2005). 
 202.  820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 110/1, 112/10 (West 2008); LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:664 
(2017).  
 203.  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.556 (West 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.12.175 
(West 2008).  
 204.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-104 (2015); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 659.001 (West 2015).  
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(Arizona, Texas) overlooked differences in statutory language and inter-
preted their statutes as following the same standards as the federal EPA.205  
Courts in five others did not expressly define their statutory text.206 
Notably, however, Washington state law remains open to broader inter-
pretation.  In an early case, the Washington Supreme Court explained, “The 
federal [Equal Pay A]ct may impose a heavier burden than the state act due 
to its threshold requirement of ‘equal’ work compared with the state act’s 
threshold requirement of ‘similar’ work[,]” which the Court held was satis-
fied by the parties’ stipulation that the plaintiff and her comparator “per-
formed substantially similar work.”207  Fifteen years later, relying on the state 
high court’s decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit reiterated that the federal EPA was “more stringent” because “under the 
Washington State Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff need only prove that the em-
ployer paid different wages to men and women who performed similar 
work.”208 
Beyond the language of “similarity,” state laws in fourteen other states 
require that women and men be paid the same for “comparable” work, which 
opens the door to even greater breadth of worker comparison.  Thirteen of 
these laws require that men and women be paid for “work of comparable 
character”209 or for “comparable work” requiring “comparable” skills or re-
quirements.210  Notably one state, Iowa, goes further to prohibit pay discrim-
ination, in public sector employment only, “for work of comparable worth 
between jobs held predominantly by women and jobs held predominantly by 
                                                 
 205.  See Isom v. JDA Software Inc., No. CV-12-02649-PHX-JAT, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
84845, at *35 (D. Ariz. June 29, 2015) (describing the Arizona equal pay law); Attieh v. Univ. of 
Tex., No. 03-04-00450-CV, 2005 WL 1412124, at *7 (Tex. App. June 16, 2005) (holding “that a 
prima facie case under the Texas [public sector] statute requires the same showing as federal law”). 
 206.  As of February 2018, an original survey of case law conducted by the author using Westlaw 
and Lexis found no reported cases directly addressing definitions of relevant statutory text in Illi-
nois, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, and Montana. 
 207.  Adams v. Univ. of Wash., 722 P.2d 74, 77 (Wash. 1986).  But see Hudon v. W. Valley 
Sch. Dist., 97 P.3d 39, 43 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (noting more generally that “Washington’s equal 
pay act . . . is virtually identical to its federal counterpart, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d),” so that “[d]ecisions 
interpreting the federal act may then be helpful” in a state law case (first citing Oliver v. Pac. Nw. 
Bell Tel. Co., 724 P.2d 1003 (1986); and then citing Adams, 722 P.2d at 74)). 
 208.  Hemmings v. Tidyman’s Inc., 285 F.3d 1174, 1190–91 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added) 
(citing Adams, 722 P.2d at 76–78). 
 209.  See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.220(a)(5) (West 2016); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. 
§ 3-304(b)(1)(i) (LexisNexis 2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 652.220(1)(a) (2015); W. VA. CODE, § 21-
5E-1(c) (LexisNexis 2013) (utilizing “work of comparable character” language). 
 210.  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-601(a) (LexisNexis 2012) (requiring “equal compensation 
for equal services”); IDAHO CODE § 44-1702(1) (1969); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.423(1) (West 
2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 628 (1964); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1221 (2010) (referring to 
“equal work” rather than “comparable work”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-06.1-01 (2014); OKLA. STAT. 
§ 40-198.1 (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-12-15 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-2-202(a) 
(2014) (utilizing the term “comparable work”). 
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men,” which the statute further defines as “the value of work as measured by 
the composite of the skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions nor-
mally required.”211 
As described in Part III.A, the language of “comparability” in state laws 
stemmed from the “comparable worth” movement of advocates and legal 
scholars in the 1980s to strengthen the ability of equal pay laws to redress the 
gender pay gap.212  Yet, with one exception, state courts have failed to so 
hold.  Courts in five of the fourteen states made no mention of the difference 
between “comparable” and “equal” work, instead interpreting their state stat-
utes to be consistent with the federal EPA.213  Courts in eight other states did 
not expressly define their statutory text, including the state of Iowa, in which 
the potential reach of “comparable worth” for public sector workers remains 
untested.214  This leaves the door open for courts to interpret law in these 
eight states in ways that meet the full promise of what their statutory text 
allows. 
Lastly, as detailed in Part III.C, below, in response to the persistence of 
the gender pay gap, California, Massachusetts, and Oregon have passed re-
cent amendments to their existing state equal pay laws that go even further.215  
                                                 
 211.  IOWA CODE § 70A.18 (2016) (emphasis added).  Notably, for private sector workers, 
Iowa’s statute uses the traditional Equal Pay Act language requiring equal wages for “equal work 
on jobs…requir[ing] equal skill, effort, and responsibility,…performed under similar working con-
ditions,” but it applies to pay differences based on the protected classes of “age, race, creed, color, 
sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, religion, or disability,” IOWA CODE ANN. § 
216.6A(2)(a) (2010), making it broader than other state laws.  See supra notes 304–305, 312–313 
(discussing new California and Oregon state laws’ reach to more protected classes).  
 212.  See infra Part III.A. 
 213.  These states are Alaska, Kentucky, Maryland, Tennessee, and West Virginia.  See Alaska 
St. Comm’n for Human Rights v. Alaska, 796 P.2d 458, 461–62 (Alaska 1990) (“[T]he history of 
[the state statute] convinces us that the proper interpretation of the phrase ‘comparable character’ is 
as an equal pay for substantially equal work provision.”); Brown v. Wood, 575 P.2d 760, 768 
(Alaska 1978) (following the federal Equal Pay Act in burdens of proof); Wiseman v. Whayne 
Supply Co., 359 F. Supp. 2d 579, 589 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (“‘Equal work’ does not require that the 
jobs be identical, but only that there exist ‘substantial equality of skill, effort, responsibility and 
working conditions.’” (quoting Odomes v. Nucare, Inc., 653 F.2d 246, 250 (6th Cir. 1981))); Cohens 
v. Md. Dep’t of Human Res., 933 F. Supp. 2d 735, 747 (D. Md. 2013); Nixon v. State, 625 A.2d 
404, 407, 409 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (interpreting the state definition as same as the federal 
Equal Pay Act definition); Tolliver v. Children’s Home-Chambliss Shelter, 784 F. Supp. 2d 893, 
903–04 (E.D. Tenn. 2011) (following the federal Equal Pay Act in burdens of proof); Largent v. W. 
Va. Div. of Health, 452 S.E.2d 42, 46 (W. Va. 1994) (describing the state statute as an “‘Equal Pay 
for Equal Work’ statute”). 
 214.  As of February 2018, an original survey of case law conducted by the author using Westlaw 
and Lexis found no reported cases directly addressing definitions of relevant statutory text in Ar-
kansas, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota.  But see Ham-
mer v. Branstad, 463 N.W.2d 86, 87 (Iowa 1990) (holding that Governor’s action undoing wage 
adjustments did not violate comparable worth statute). 
 215.  See infra Part III.C; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.149, § 105A (West eff. Jan. 1, 2018); CAL. LAB. 
CODE § 1197.5 (West 2017); OR. REV. STAT. § 252 (effective Jan. 1, 2019). 
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These new statutes, effective in 2017, 2018, and 2019 respectively, offer the 
greatest potential yet for using antidiscrimination law to redress workforce 
segregation and stereotyping that contribute to the gender pay gap.216 
In sum, out of twenty-four states that use different comparisons for state 
equal pay laws than “equal work,” only seven have indicated that they follow 
federal Equal Pay Act precedent on the threshold question of how closely 
work must be compared to be actionable.  That leaves thirteen states whose 
state equal pay acts could be interpreted to reach a broader comparison,217 as 
well as four states (California, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Washington) 
whose state laws already do.218 
  
                                                 
 216.  See infra Part III.C; AAUW, supra note 47, at 26–27 (noting that “a handful of states have 
particularly robust laws governing equal pay” and describing features of laws in California, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, and Tennessee). 
 217.  See supra text accompanying notes 213–214.   
 218.  See supra text accompanying note 215. 
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STATE EQUAL PAY ACTS AND THE POSSIBILITY FOR BROADER 
INTERPRETATIONS UNDER STATE LAW: 
33 STATES FOLLOW FEDERAL LAW 
No state equal pay law 
(2 + D.C.) 
Alabama, Mississippi  
 
[+ District of Columbia] 
State law with same lan-
guage as federal EPA 
(24) 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming 
 
[+ Iowa, “equal work” for private sector work-
ers; also prohibits unequal pay by race or other 
protected class] 
State law with broader 
language, but that state 
courts have interpreted 
to follow EPA (7) 
Alaska, Arizona, Kentucky, Maryland, Tennes-
see, Texas*, West Virginia 
 
[*protections for public sector workers only]   
 
17 STATES OPEN TO BROADER INTERPRETATION 
State law with broader 
language and no court 
interpretation (13) 
“Comparable worth”: Iowa*  
“Comparable work”: Arkansas, Idaho, Maine, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
South Dakota 
“Same or substantially similar work”: Illinois, 
Louisiana 
“Similarly employed”: Michigan 
“Same quantity and quality of the same classi-
fication of work”: Missouri  
“Equivalent service or the same amount or 
class of work”: Montana*  
 
[*protections for public sector workers only]   
State law with broader 
language and broader in-
tent or court interpreta-
tion (4) 
“Substantially similar work”: California*  
“Work of like or comparable character”: Mas-
sachusetts 
“Work of comparable character”: Oregon**  
“Similarly employed”: Washington 
 
[*also prohibits unequal pay by race] 
[**also prohibits unequal pay by race or other 
protected class] 
III.  LAW REFORM EFFORTS 
Since the late 1970s, equal pay advocates and legal scholars have 
worked to improve existing law and expand its ability to redress the gender 
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pay gap.  To date, these efforts have focused primarily on improving pay 
equity for women; yet the most far-reaching current efforts include a focus 
on racial pay equity as well.  This Part provides an overview of past and 
current efforts to reform equal pay laws at both the federal and state levels. 
A.  1980s Comparable Worth Movement 
Recent efforts at the state level to strengthen equal pay laws in response 
to the stubborn persistence of the gender pay gap echo an earlier, more 
sweeping attempt to remedy the problem: the comparable worth movement 
of the 1980s.  In the 1970s, due to concern that the passage of Title VII and 
the Equal Pay Act had not closed the gender pay gap, and to overcome the 
challenge of a sex-segregated workforce, pay equity advocates began to ar-
gue for the recognition of a theory of “comparable worth.”219  Under compa-
rable worth theory, “sex-based wage discrimination exists if employees in 
job classifications occupied primarily by women are paid less than employ-
ees in job classifications filled primarily by men, if the jobs are of equal value 
to the employer, though otherwise dissimilar.”220   
Employers would be required to pay equal wages for different jobs that 
are “comparable in value or worth” but “filled predominantly by women and 
men respectively.”221  While requiring comparable worth seemed beyond the 
reach of the EPA’s statutory language prohibiting unequal pay for “equal 
work,” Title VII’s broader language prohibiting pay discrimination “on the 
basis of sex” provided an opening for such an argument.222  The concept of 
comparable worth was buoyed by the head of the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (“EEOC”) during the Carter Administration, Eleanor 
Holmes Norton, but later renounced by President Reagan, who called it a 
“cockamamie idea,” and rejected by Reagan’s EEOC chair, Clarence 
Thomas.223 
In the courts, the potential for comparable worth law was shaped by 
three important cases decided between 1981 and 1985.  First, in 1981 in 
County of Washington v. Gunther,224 the Supreme Court opened up the pos-
                                                 
 219.  See Nancy Levit & Joan Mahoney, The Future of Comparable Worth Theory, 56 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 99, 100 (1984); Paul Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth, 
99 HARV. L. REV. 1728, 1728–29 (1986).  See generally Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seri-
ously, supra note 33.   
 220.  Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps. v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 
1985) (emphasis added). 
 221.  Weiler, supra note 219, at 1728. 
 222.  Levit & Mahoney, supra note 219, at 100, 104. 
 223.  Weiler, supra note 219, at 1729. 
 224.  452 U.S. 161 (1981). 
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sibility of comparable worth arguments by holding that Title VII’s prohibi-
tions against sex discrimination in pay could be read more broadly than the 
Equal Pay Act, thus reviving a pay discrimination complaint filed by female 
prison guards paid less than their male peers.225  As mentioned previously, 
when Title VII was passed in 1964, it included what was known as the Ben-
nett Amendment, to comport Title VII with the EPA that had been passed the 
year prior.226  The Amendment required that each of the affirmative defenses 
available to an employer under the EPA—for pay differentials based on a 
seniority or merit system, a pay system based on “quantity or quality of pro-
duction,” or “any other factor other than sex”—were also defenses to Title 
VII claims of pay discrimination.227  In Gunther, the Court held that allowing 
such defenses did not also require a female Title VII plaintiff to prove she 
was performing “equal work,” so long as she could create an inference of pay 
discrimination because of sex.228  Indeed, over a dissent by Justice Rehnquist, 
the Court’s majority noted that it was not directly addressing “the controver-
sial concept of ‘comparable worth’” in the Gunther case, leaving the door 
open for its further development.229 
Yet any such hope for the adoption of a comparable worth approach 
failed to materialize in Gunther’s wake.230  Two years later, in Spaulding v. 
University of Washington,231 the Ninth Circuit rejected a claim brought by 
University of Washington’s School of Nursing faculty that they were under-
paid relative to other faculty departments.232  In doing so, the court held 
clearly—in accord with similar cases in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits—that 
plaintiffs could not make out a Title VII disparate impact claim using com-
parable worth theory.233  Then, in 1985, the Ninth Circuit dealt comparable 
worth another blow in American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees (AFSCME) v. Washington,234 when it held that a class of 15,500 
state employees who worked in female-dominated job categories (women 
composed over 70% of the positions) could allege neither disparate impact 
                                                 
 225.  Id. at 189. 
 226.  Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (June 10, 1963); Bennett Amend-
ment, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 257 (1964). 
 227.  29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1964); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964). 
 228.  Gunther, 452 U.S. at 180. 
 229.  Id. at 166.  But see Gunther, 452 U.S. 183–84 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that Title 
VII and the Equal Pay Act explicitly rejected the notion of “comparable worth”).  
 230.  See Judith Olans Brown et al., Equal Pay for Jobs of Comparable Worth: An Analysis of 
the Rhetoric, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 127, 127 (1986); Norman Vieira, Comparable Worth and 
the Gunther Case: The New Drive for Equal Pay, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 449, 459 (1985). 
 231.  740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1983).  
 232.  Id. at 705–07. 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985).  
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nor disparate treatment under Title VII using a comparable worth argu-
ment.235  Moreover, the court robustly supported a “market defense,” holding 
that, even where the employer conducted a pay equity study that exposed 
disparities by gender, setting pay using “prevailing market rates” did not con-
stitute intentional discrimination under Title VII: 
Neither law nor logic deems the free market system a suspect en-
terprise. . . . We find nothing in the language of Title VII or its leg-
islative history to indicate Congress intended to abrogate funda-
mental economic principles such as the laws of supply and demand 
or to prevent employers from competing in the labor market.  
While the Washington legislature may have the discretion to enact 
a comparable worth plan if it chooses to do so, Title VII does not 
obligate it to eliminate an economic inequality that it did not cre-
ate.236 
Despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court never weighed in 
on the debate, as a result of the Spaulding and AFSCME cases, legal scholars 
noted that the likelihood of achieving comparable worth through the courts 
was essentially foreclosed, and that advocates should instead turn their focus 
to legislative change and advances through collective bargaining.237 
At the state level, in the wake of the comparable worth movement, at 
least one third of state legislatures enacted state equal pay laws that explicitly 
went further than equal pay for “equal” work, to include concepts of similar-
ity or comparability.238  At the federal level, since the late 1980s, the idea of 
comparable worth all but vanished from the agenda of those seeking to pro-
tect against sex discrimination; they instead turned their focus to issues of 
sexual harassment, promotion and the glass ceiling, and pregnancy and fam-
ily medical leave.239  In more recent years, concepts of equivalence or com-
parability have reappeared in legislative proposals to amend the Equal Pay 
                                                 
 235.  Id. at 1406–07.  
 236.  Id. at 1407 (citations omitted) (first citing Lemons v. Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); and then citing Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th 
Cir. 1977)). 
 237.  See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1207 (1988); Com-
parable Worth Claims Under Title VII: Does the Evidence Support an Inference of Discriminatory 
Intent?—American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees v. Washington, 61 
WASH. L. REV. 781 (1986); Jean C. Kissane, Comment, The Status of Comparable Worth: Spauld-
ing v. University of Washington, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 119 (1985); Tina L. Speiser, The Future of 
Comparable Worth: Looking in New Directions, 37 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1189 (1987).  But see Nancy 
E. Dowd, The Metamorphosis of Comparable Worth, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 833, 865 (1986). 
 238.  See supra Part II.C. 
 239.  See, e.g., Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, supra note 33, at 1001, n.14, 1077 
n.444 (citing scholarship during this time period); U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
POLICY GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (Mar. 19, 1990), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/currentissues.html; DEP’T OF LABOR, A FACT-FINDING REPORT 
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Act in the Fair Pay Act introduced in legislative sessions since the mid-1990s 
by Eleanor Holmes Norton, now a District of Columbia Congressperson.240  
Importantly, however, efforts to expand comparisons in equal pay stat-
utes use the terms equivalent, similar, or comparable “work,” not “worth.”  
Even in states that enacted statutes adopting a comparability approach, all 
private sector laws use the term “comparable work.”241  As Deborah Thomp-
son Eisenberg has noted, this is a key difference: a comparable “work” statute 
“still require[s] proof” that there are “common similarities between the jobs,” 
which is “a factual question about the nature of the work, not a value question 
about the intrinsic ‘worth’ of the job.”242  Today, “comparable worth” con-
cepts have largely been replaced by a more pragmatic, middle-ground ap-
proach to go beyond “equal work.” 
B.  Current Federal Reform Efforts 
In the wake of the challenges faced by comparable worth advocates in 
the 1980s, gender equality advocates shifted their focus: equal pay law was 
not forgotten, but it was overshadowed by other legislative efforts to improve 
women’s access to higher paying jobs.243  Starting in the mid-1990s, two fed-
eral legislative strategies around equal pay re-emerged, attracting greater at-
tention in the past decade, due to the seemingly intractable persistence of the 
gender pay gap despite women’s advancement otherwise.  At the federal 
level, the most popular reform efforts now focus not on broadening the con-
cept of “equal work” but, instead, on narrowing employer defenses under the 
Equal Pay Act and encouraging employer compliance. 
                                                 
OF THE FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMMISSION 3 (1995), https://www.dol.gov/oasam/pro-
grams/history/reich/reports/ceiling.pdf (“The Federal Glass Ceiling Commission systematically 
gathered information on barriers, opportunities, policies, perceptions, and practices as they affect 
… groups that historically have been underrepresented in private sector top-level management [in-
cluding] women of all races and ethnicities.”); DEP’T OF LABOR, NEED TIME? THE EMPLOYEE’S 
GUIDE TO THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT 2 (2015), https://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/em-
ployeeguide.pdf (explaining the details of taking FMLA leave). 
 240.  See Rhonda Jennings Blackburn, Note, Comparable Worth and the Fair Pay Act of 1994, 
84 KY. L.J. 1277, 1291 (1996); Compare Fair Pay Act of 1993, H.R.4803, 103rd Cong. (1993), and 
Fair Pay Act of 2017, H.R.2095, 115th Cong. (2017) 
 241.  See supra Part II.C.  Only one statute, the Iowa statute applying to public sector workers, 
uses the term “comparable “worth.”  See text accompanying supra note 211; IOWA CODE § 70A.18 
(2016).   
 242.  See Eisenberg, Shattering, supra note 182, at 48.  Eisenberg argues that while “comparable 
worth can be a powerful political mobilizing force to raise consciousness about pay inequities,” a 
“comparable worth model is not the best approach for a statutory remedy for pay discrimination.”  
Id. at 49.  
 243.  See supra note 239. 
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1.  Amending the Equal Pay Act 
Since the mid-1990s, some federal legislators have engaged in efforts to 
remedy the gender pay gap by acknowledging the limitations of and working 
to amend the existing Equal Pay Act.244  Two parallel efforts have emerged.  
One, the Fair Pay Act, sponsored by Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton, 
would directly expand the Act’s focus on “equal work,” to require equal pay 
“for work on equivalent jobs” in any “job that is dominated by employees of 
a particular sex, race, or national origin.”245  Under the bill, “equivalent jobs” 
is further defined as “jobs that may be dissimilar, but whose requirements are 
equivalent, when viewed as a composite of skills, effort, responsibility, and 
working conditions.”246  This approach would directly address both gender 
and racial workforce segregation and discrimination, making it likely to help 
reduce the pay gaps.  Yet, despite being introduced in each of the last thirteen 
legislative sessions, the bill has never made it out of committee, and Con-
gressional co-sponsorship has waned, particularly as interest has shifted to a 
second approach.247 
The second federal legislative effort, the Paycheck Fairness Act 
(“PFA”), leaves unchanged the statute’s definition of “equal work,” instead 
focusing on its affirmative defenses and damages, once an employee plaintiff 
has met that threshold requirement.248  Introduced for the first time several 
years after the Fair Pay Act, the PFA has been raised in each of the last eleven 
sessions, also with no success to date.249  Yet the PFA has attracted more 
interest and more co-sponsorship in recent years, now overtaking the Fair Pay 
                                                 
 244.  See Brake, supra note 193, at 890–91; Fair Pay Act of 1993, H.R. 4803, 103rd Cong. 
(1993); Paycheck Fairness Act 1997, H.R. 2023, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 245.  H.R. 2095, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  See H.R. 2095, 115th Cong. (2017) (listing 16 Congressional co-sponsors); H.R. 1787, 
114th Cong. (2015) (1 co-sponsor); H.R. 438, 113th Cong. (2013) (0 co-sponsors); H.R. 1493, 112th 
Cong. (2011) (1 co-sponsor); H.R .2151, 111th Cong. (2009) (0 co-sponsors); H.R. 2019, 110th 
Cong. (2007) (10 co-sponsors); H.R. 1697, 109th Cong. (2005) (21 co-sponsors); H.R. 1695, 108th 
Cong. (2003) (20 co-sponsors); H.R. 1362, 107th Cong. (2001) (19 co-sponsors); H.R. 1271, 106th 
Cong. (1999) (79 co-sponsors); H.R. 1302, 105th Cong. (1997) (64 cosponsors); H.R. 1507, 104th 
Cong. (1995) (52 co-sponsors); H.R. 4803, 103rd Cong. (1993) (36 co-sponsors). 
 248.  See S. 819, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 1869, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 249.  H.R.1869, 115th Cong. (2017-2018) (listing 198 Congressional co-sponsors); H.R.1619, 
114th Cong. (2015-2016) (193 co-sponsors); H.R.377, 113th Cong. (2013) (208 co-sponsors); 
H.R.1519, 112th Cong. (2011) (197 co-sponsors); H.R.12, 111th Cong. (2009) (200 co-sponsors); 
H.R.1338, 110th Cong. (2007) (230 co-sponsors); H.R.1687, 109th Cong. (2005) (111 co-sponsors); 
H.R.1688, 108th Cong. (2003) (116 co-sponsors); H.R.781, 107th Cong. (2001) (196 co-sponsors); 
H.R.2397, 106th Cong. (1999) (170 co-sponsors); H.R.541, 106th Cong. (1999)  (122 co-sponsors); 
H.R.2023, 105th Cong. (1997) (95 co-sponsors). 
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Act as the frontrunner in federal legislative efforts to redress the gender pay 
gap.250  
In its current form,251 the PFA focuses on three main changes to 
strengthen existing protections under the Equal Pay Act.  First, it would sig-
nificantly narrow the employer’s affirmative defense that a demonstrated pay 
disparity is due to a “factor other than sex.”252  Under the bill, the defense is 
narrowed to only “a bona fide factor other than sex, such as education, train-
ing, or experience,” which is met only upon an employer’s ability to demon-
strate that the factor “accounts for the differential in compensation,” is both 
“job-related” and “consistent with business necessity,” and is “not based 
upon or derived from a sex-based differential in compensation.”253  This 
would be an influential change, holding the employer strictly liable for unex-
plained disparate outcomes and importing language from the disparate im-
pact context of Title VII.254  The burden on the employer to justify a pay 
disparity in this manner could expose unexamined stereotypes and limit jus-
tifications that are correlated with sex or infected with bias—for example, 
setting pay based on employees’ prior salaries.255 
Second, the bill would strengthen anti-retaliation protections for em-
ployees penalized for discussing or seeking to discover information about 
firm-wide pay for the purposes of ensuring pay equity.256  Scholars and ad-
vocates have noted the importance of “pay transparency” in exposing the 
problem of gender pay disparities so that employees have the information 
they need to enforce existing law.257  Third, the PFA would also encourage 
                                                 
 250.  See supra note 249.  Companion bills have been introduced in the Senate.  The Fair Pay 
Act was introduced in the Senate in nine of its thirteen sessions, each year from 1995 to 2013, with 
between eight and sixteen Senate co-sponsors.  See, e.g., S. 168, 113th Cong. (2013) (listing 10 
Senate co-sponsors); S. 1650, 104th Cong. (1995) (8 co-sponsors).  The Paycheck Fairness Act was 
introduced in the Senate in each of its eleven sessions, with between eighteen and fifty-six Senate 
co-sponsors.  See, e.g., S. 819, 115th Cong. (2017) (listing 48 Senate co-sponsors); S. 71, 105th 
Cong. (1997) (23 co-sponsors). 
 251.  See S. 819, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 1869, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 252.  See S. 819, § 3; H.R. 1869, § 3. 
 253.  S. 819, § 3; H.R. 1869, § 3.   
 254.  See Brake, supra note 193, at 890–93. 
 255.  See id. at 911 (“Enabling the doctrine to expose the weaknesses behind these rationales 
would reveal the implicit gender bias in discretionary pay systems that results in paying women less 
for substantially equal work.”). 
 256.  See S. 819, § 8; H.R. 1869, § 8.   
 257.  See, e.g., Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine, supra note 193, at 963 (2011) (“The ben-
efit of transparency lies not simply in the final wage results, but in the very process of developing a 
compensation system with clearly understood goals, performance standards, and auditing con-
trols.”); Gowri Ramachandran, Pay Transparency, 116 Penn. St. L. Rev. 1043, 1043 (2012) (arguing 
pay transparency may “help prevent, root out, and correct the discrimination in the first place”); 
Cynthia Estlund, Extending the Case for Workplace Transparency to Information About Pay, U.C. 
Irvine L. Rev. 781, 783 (2014) (“[M]andatory disclosure of meaningful salary information would 
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private enforcement by increasing the potential damages available to plain-
tiffs who sue to allow possible compensatory and punitive damages not cur-
rently available under the EPA.258 
The PFA as currently drafted stands to significantly improve the ability 
of employees to prevail should they bring a lawsuit under the EPA.  Moreo-
ver, by limiting defenses and placing the burden on employers to justify pay 
disparities they claim are not due to sex, the PFA could also help redress the 
portion of the gender pay gap due to stereotyping and discrimination.  Yet to 
be sure, it is difficult to pass federal legislation expanding civil rights reme-
dies, a task made all the more unlikely given that Republicans, who generally 
oppose such an expansion, will likely control the legislature and the presi-
dency until at least 2020.259   
More importantly, however, even if the PFA were to pass and become 
law, its approach does little to redress the challenge to pay equity posed by 
steep occupational segregation and the significant portion of the pay gap it 
causes.260  The PFA as currently drafted leaves the requirement of “equal 
work” entirely untouched, doing nothing to expand enforcement for the vast 
majority of women who cannot point to a virtually identical comparator to 
meet the threshold prong of proving an EPA violation.261  While the PFA’s 
limitation on affirmative defenses may help narrow the portion of the gender 
wage gap caused by discrimination, it misses the key structural problem of 
gender workforce segregation. 
2.  Employer Reporting and Compliance 
While legislators work toward amending the EPA, efforts put in place 
by the executive branch during the Obama Administration—but put on hold 
by the Trump Administration—suggest a way to strengthen enforcement of 
the EPA in its current form.  Shortly after taking office in 2009, in addition 
                                                 
tend to produce less discrimination, less favoritism, and probably somewhat lower disparities over-
all.”). 
 258.  S. 819, § 3; H.R. 1869, § 3; see 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012). 
 259.  See Mattie Kahn, So, How Do GOP Lawmakers Defend Opposition to Equal Pay?, ELLE 
(Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.elle.com/culture/career-politics/a35547/gop-congressmen-oppose-
equal-pay/ (noting that “Congressional Republicans have blocked the Paycheck Fairness Act in 
2010, 2012, and 2014, despite overwhelming Democratic support”); Danielle Paquette, The Trump 
Administration Just Halted This Obama-Era Rule to Shrink the Gender Wage Gap, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/08/30/the-trump-admin-
istration-just-halted-this-obama-era-rule-to-shrink-the-gender-wage-
gap/?utm_term=.bd16f257b9e4. 
 260.  See supra Part I.B. 
 261.  S. 819, § 3; H.R. 1869, § 3; see 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012).  The PFA does broaden the 
requirement that comparators work in the “same establishment” to all of the employer’s workplaces 
within a county, which would broaden very slightly the geographic region from which a virtually 
identical comparator could be drawn.  S. 819, § 3; H.R. 1869.   
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to making the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act his first enacted legislation,262 
President Obama established the National Equal Pay Enforcement Task 
Force to provide policy recommendations on how to close the gender wage 
gap.263  As recommended by the Task Force, the administration worked to-
ward requiring larger employers to provide pay data as part of their reporting 
requirements under federal law.264 
Federal law requires private employers of 100 or more employees to 
provide certain data about their workforces to the federal government by 
completing what is known as the EEO-1 form on an annual basis.265  On Feb-
ruary 1, 2016, the EEOC issued a notice of proposed changes to the EEO-1 
form to require employers to disclose “aggregate data on pay ranges and 
hours worked” by their workforce.266  The rule was finalized in September 
2016, with requirements to collect new data going into effect in 2017 and 
included in the first report due March 31, 2018.267  The new rule would have 
required private employers with 100 or more employees to report “summary 
pay data” and “aggregate hours worked data,” which would have included 
identifying part-time and full-time employees in each of twelve salary bands 
within ten job categories by sex and race, and the hours worked by all em-
ployees in each band.268  The goal of the enhanced reporting requirements 
was to facilitate greater pay transparency, both to help enforcement agencies 
spot trends in pay disparities among industries for targeted enforcement, and 
to facilitate greater voluntary employer compliance with equal pay laws.269  
Yet the potential positive impact of requiring pay transparency from large 
                                                 
 262.  See Brown, supra note 148. 
 263.  National Equal Pay Enforcement Task Force, WHITE HOUSE, https://obamawhitehouse.ar-
chives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/equal_pay_task_force.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2018).  
 264.  Id.  
 265.  See About the EEO-1 Survey, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1survey/about.cfm (last visited Mar. 12, 2018); Filing Proce-
dures, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeo1sur-
vey/2007instructions.cfm (last visited Mar. 12, 2018). 
 266.  Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Announces Proposed Ad-
dition of Pay Data to Annual EEO-1 Reports (Jan. 29, 2016), [hereinafter Press Release] 
(https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-29-16.cfm); Agency Information Collection Ac-
tivities: Revision of the Employer Information Report (EEO-1) and Comment Request, 81 Fed. Reg. 
5113 (Feb. 1, 2016). 
 267.  Kevin McGowan, EEOC Finalizes Employer Pay Data Requirement, BLOOMBERG BNA 
(Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.bna.com/eeoc-finalizes-employer-n57982077780/. 
 268.  See EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, SAMPLE REVISED EEO-1 FORM, 
http://src.bna.com/i1A (last visited Mar. 12, 2018); McGowan, supra note 267; Press Release, supra 
note 266. 
 269.  See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Obama Moves to Expand Rules Aimed at Closing Gender Pay 
Gap, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/29/us/politics/obama-moves-
to-expand-rules-aimed-at-closing-gender-pay-gap.html; Press Release, supra note 266. 
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employers will not be realized anytime soon: in August 2017, the Trump Ad-
ministration announced that it was abandoning the new reporting require-
ments.270 
In a separate effort, inspired by the work of private company 
Salesforce.com and its CEO Marc Benioff to equalize pay within that com-
pany,271 the Obama White House launched an initiative to get private em-
ployers to sign a pledge to work towards correcting their own pay dispari-
ties.272  Employer signatories to the pledge commit to, among other things, 
“conducting an annual company-wide gender pay analysis across occupa-
tions” and “embedding equal pay efforts into broader enterprise-wide equity 
initiatives.”273  As of the time President Obama left office in December 2016, 
over 100 private companies and organizations had signed the pledge, includ-
ing eBay, Apple, AT&T, MasterCard, Staples, Dow Chemical, and Pep-
siCo.274 
While laudable, reporting requirements and voluntary efforts can only 
go so far to close the gender pay gap.  To the extent that these federal reform 
efforts increase pay transparency and encourage voluntary employer compli-
ance with existing equal pay laws, the net result will, of course, be a positive 
impact on helping to reduce the gender wage gap, even if only slightly.  And, 
as discussed in Part IV, below, voluntary employer efforts stand to provide 
another advantage: the more employers who successfully work to create pay 
equity among their own ranks, the more examples plaintiffs have to argue 
that jobs need not be identical in order to compare pay—that it is possible to 
take a firm-wide view of “equal work.”275 
C.  Current State Reform Efforts 
While federal legislative efforts have stalled, state policymakers have 
taken an active role in working to amend and strengthen their own state equal 
                                                 
 270.  See Claire Cain Miller, One Effort to Close the Gender Pay Gap Won’t Get a Try Under 
Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/31/upshot/one-effort-to-
close-the-gender-pay-gap-wont-get-a-try.html; Paquette, supra note 259. 
 271.  See AAUW, supra note 47, at 22 (noting that “Salesforce’s actions . . . inspire[d] the 
Obama administration to announce the White House’s Equal Pay Pledge”); Lauren Weber, Why 
Employers Are Making Pay Equity a Reality, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/ar-
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 272.  White House Equal Pay Pledge, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE, https://obamawhitehouse.ar-
chives.gov/webform/white-house-equal-pay-pledge (last visited Mar. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Equal 
Pay Pledge]; Fact Sheet: White House Announces New Commitments to the Equal Pay Pledge, 
OBAMA WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 7, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-of-
fice/2016/12/07/fact-sheet-white-house-announces-new-commitments-equal-pay-pledge [hereinaf-
ter Fact Sheet]; AAUW, supra note 47, at 22. 
 273.  Equal Pay Pledge, supra note 272. 
 274.  See Fact Sheet, supra note 272; Weber, supra note 271. 
 275.  See infra Part IV.A.2. 
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pay protections.  In the past two legislative sessions, legislators in over forty 
states have introduced bills to add to existing state equal pay protections, pro-
posing a variety of ideas and approaches.276  Three states in particular, Cali-
fornia, Massachusetts, and Oregon, have succeeded in enacting the most far-
reaching legislation to date that promises to offer new solutions to remedy 
both gender and racial pay gaps.277 
1.  Massachusetts Law, Effective 2018 
In 2016, the Massachusetts legislature enacted amendments to 
strengthen the state’s equal pay act that took effect January 1, 2018.278  Mas-
sachusetts was one of the states to have already enacted a state law with 
broader statutory language than federal law,279 under which it required equal 
pay “for work of like or comparable character or work on like or comparable 
operations.”280  And, as in Washington, Massachusetts courts had interpreted 
the state law to go further than the federal EPA.281  Yet, existing state law did 
not define “comparable”; as amended, the state equal pay act now arguably 
broadens its own required comparisons.282  Under the revised act, employers 
will be required to provide equal pay for “comparable work,” which it defines 
as “work that is substantially similar in that it requires substantially similar 
skill, effort and responsibility and is performed under similar working condi-
tions.”283 
The revised act also specifically prohibits an employer from “seek[ing] 
the salary history of any prospective employee from any current or former 
employer,”284 making it the first state in the nation to do so.285  Existing state 
law did not provide for an employer’s “‘factor other than sex’ affirmative 
defense”—only for an affirmative defense based on seniority—so no amend-
                                                 
 276.  See infra text accompanying notes 315–316. 
 277.  See infra notes 278–314. 
 278.  An Act to Establish Pay Equity, S. 2119 § 105A, 189th Gen. Court (Mass. 2016) (enacted). 
 279.  See supra Part II.C. 
 280.  Mark Esposito, Massachusetts Pay Equity and Its Limits, 87 B.U. L. REV. 911, 916 (2007). 
 281.  See, e.g., Mullenix v. Forsyth Dental Infirmary for Children, 965 F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 
1996); Jancey v. Sch. Comm. of Everett, 695 N.E. 2d 194 (Mass. 1998); see also Esposito, supra 
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 282.  See Lisa Stephanian Burton & Douglas T. Schwarz, Massachusetts Legislature Passes 
Sweeping Equal Pay Amendments, NAT’L L. REV. (July 29, 2016), https://www.natlawre-
view.com/article/massachusetts-legislature-passes-sweeping-equal-pay-amendments. 
 283.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A (2018). 
 284.  Id. 
 285.  Jena McGregor, What a New Equal Pay Law in Massachusetts Could Do for Everyone, 
Not Just Women, WASH. POST (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leader-
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ment to such a provision was required, as it would be in other states and fed-
eral law.286  But the first-of-its-kind provision barring reliance on prior salary 
specifically excludes a common factor that is often infected with sex stereo-
types.  As a result, it serves as a model for other states seeking to rein in sex-
linked “factors other than sex,” by clearly prohibiting a particularly troubling 
defense, without requiring evidence from the plaintiff that prior salary infor-
mation is impermissibly “sex-based.”287 
Moreover, without adding specific protections for race-based unequal 
pay, this provision could have the effect of equalizing salaries based on race, 
too, if employers stop entirely the practice of asking all employees about 
prior salaries.288 
2.  California Law, Effective 2017 and 2018 
California went even further than Massachusetts when, also in 2016, the 
legislature significantly strengthened state law.289  Effective January 1, 2017, 
California’s state version of the EPA requires employers to provide equal pay 
for “substantially similar work, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, 
and responsibility, and performed under similar working conditions.”290  
Prior versions of the law mirrored the federal requirement for “equal work” 
on jobs requiring “equal skill, effort, and responsibility . . . performed under 
similar working conditions.”291  The amendment makes clear the legislature’s 
intent to broaden the comparison of workers beyond only near-identical 
jobs.292 
Indeed, an original draft of the amendment used the term “comparable 
work,” but was stricken and replaced with “substantially similar” work, likely 
as a compromise in response to concerns from the California Chamber of 
Commerce that “determining ‘comparable’ work for different job duties can 
                                                 
 286.  Esposito, supra note 280, at 933–34. 
 287.  Compare Mass. S. 2119, with S. 1063, 2016 Leg. (Cal. 2016) (enacted) and S. 862, 114th 
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Act of 1963.”). 
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be extremely subjective, leading to different interpretations and, thus the po-
tential for litigation.”293  Yet legislative analysis of the bill demonstrates that 
the legislators were aware California was lagging behind other states that had 
gone beyond “equal work” to require equal pay for “work of a substantially 
similar or comparable character.”294  The goal in revising the statutory text, 
then—even without using the term “comparable work”—was to go further, 
“to eliminate the gender wage gap by prohibiting pay differentials between 
men and women for substantially similar work,” and to clarify the scope of 
comparison.295  As explained in the Senate Judiciary Committee analysis of 
the bill: 
Existing case law has developed in such a way as to make it unclear 
whether “equal work” means exactly the same job or substantially 
similar job . . .  [Under the act as amended,] a plaintiff . . . would 
not have to prove that the jobs were equal in order to be paid the 
same wages; rather, the plaintiff’s burden would be to show that 
the man and woman should be paid the same wages because, when 
viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility, they were 
performing substantially similar jobs.296 
Beyond expanding threshold requirements for coverage, the new Cali-
fornia law narrows the “factor other than sex” defense in ways similar to 
those proposed in the federal Paycheck Fairness Act.297  The employer may 
defend based on a “bona fide factor other than sex, such as education, train-
ing, or experience,” and “only if the employer demonstrates that the factor is 
not based on or derived from a sex-based differential in compensation.”298  In 
addition, any bona fide factor other than sex must also be “job related” and 
“consistent with a business necessity,” defined by the statute as constituting 
“an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the factor relied upon 
effectively fulfills the business purpose it is supposed to serve.”299 
Likewise, the statute strengthens anti-retaliation protections for those 
seeking to enforce the act, and explicitly forbids employers from “pro-
hibit[ing] an employee from disclosing the employee’s own wages, discuss-
ing the wages of others, inquiring about another employee’s wages, or aiding 
or encouraging any other employee to exercise his or her rights under this 
                                                 
 293.  Id. at 5.  The hearing also highlights, as of April 25, 2015, “This Bill prohibits an employer 
from paying any employee at wage rates less than the rates paid to employees of the opposite sex 
for work of a comparable character on jobs the performance of which requires comparable skills, 
effort, and responsibility.”  Id. at 2. 
 294.  Id. at 4. 
 295.  See Conditions of Employment, supra note 291. 
 296.  Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
 297.  See supra Part III.B.1.  
 298.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5 (West 2017). 
 299.  Id. 
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section.”300  And, in a separate bill enacted in the 2017 legislative session, 
California added prohibitions on prior salary information like those that had 
been enacted in Massachusetts.301  Starting in 2018, California employers are 
prohibited from “orally or in writing, personally or through an agent, 
seek[ing] salary history information . . . about an applicant for employ-
ment.”302  Moreover, the new section requires that “upon reasonable request,” 
an employer must “provide the pay scale for a position to an applicant apply-
ing for employment.”303  It also reinforces that, as enacted in its 2016 amend-
ments to the state’s equal pay law, “prior salary, by itself, [shall not] justify 
any disparity in compensation.”304  These prohibitions in concert—narrowing 
affirmative defenses to the statute in 2016 and prohibiting prior salary infor-
mation in 2017—stand to root out rationales for setting pay that are infected 
by bias and stereotyping, even if not “sex based.” 
Yet perhaps most radically, California’s new law was one of the first in 
the nation to add “race and ethnicity” as protected groups under the state’s 
equal pay act; while all states include “race” in state versions of Title VII, 
California is among the first to include it in a state version of the federal 
Equal Pay Act (which, itself, applies only to sex discrimination in pay). 305  
This requires—as a strict labor code statute that applies without proof of any 
discriminatory intent—that employers provide equal compensation “to em-
ployees of another race or ethnicity for substantially similar work, when 
viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility, and performed un-
der similar working conditions.”306  California has provided the model for 
another legal tool to directly confront the racial pay gap—now treating racial 
pay disparities like gender pay disparities have been treated since the passage 
of the EPA in 1963. 
                                                 
 300.  Id. 
 301. Act of Oct. 12, 2017, Ch. 688 (A.B. 168) sec. 1 (codified as amended at CAL. LAB. CODE 
§ 432.3 (West effective Jan. 1, 2018)). 
 302.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3 (b) (West effective Jan. 1, 2018). 
 303.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3 (c) (West effective Jan. 1, 2018). 
 304.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3 (i) (West effective Jan. 1, 2018). 
 305.  Mollie Reilly, California Expands Equal Pay Law to Include Protections for Race and 
Ethnicity, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/california-
equal-pay-race_us_57c07edbe4b085c1ff2937f3; Allison Waterfield, California Forges Ahead with 
Equal Pay Protections, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.bna.com/california-forges-
ahead-b57982079183.  Iowa’s private sector statute requiring equal pay for “equal work” also ap-
plies to protected classes beyond sex, including, among other bases, race and national origin.  See 
supra note 210; IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.6A (2)(a) (2010). 
 306.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5 (West 2017). 
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3.  Oregon Law, Effective 2019 
Most recently, the Oregon legislature followed suit, expanding its equal 
pay act in ways that combine elements of both Massachusetts and California 
approaches for what is now arguably the most comprehensive state equal pay 
act to date.  Enacted in 2017 and effective January 2019, Oregon law now 
requires equal pay for “work of comparable character,” which it defines as 
“work that requires substantially similar knowledge, skill, effort, responsibil-
ity and working conditions in the performance of work, regardless of job de-
scription or job title”307—a definition similar to that of Massachusetts.308  
Also like Massachusetts, Oregon was one of the states whose equal pay stat-
ute used broader language of “comparable work” than the federal EPA re-
quirement of “equal work” prior to current amendments, but left comparabil-
ity undefined by statute.  Oregon court precedent has long held that 
“comparable work” in state law was broader than “equal work” in federal 
law.  In two separate cases from the mid-1980s, the Oregon Court of Appeals 
held that Oregon’s statute went further than federal law.  In one, the Court 
noted that “[w]ork of ‘comparable character’ is broader than ‘equal work’” 
and that “‘[c]omparable’ does not require equality but that two items have 
important common characteristics.”309  In the other, the Court highlighted that 
a “difference between [state and federal equal pay acts] is that the federal act 
refers to ‘equal’ work, whereas the state act refers to ‘comparable’ work, 
which is a more inclusive term.”310 
In addition to a more expansive definition of the threshold requirement 
for comparisons, the new Oregon law—like the California law—limits af-
firmative defenses available to employers to only “bona fide factor[s] that 
[are] related to the position in question,” which it defines as one of eight pos-
sible factors, with no catch-all for a “factor other than sex.”311 The Oregon 
law also prohibits, as do new California and Massachusetts laws, an employer 
                                                 
 307.  OR. REV. STAT. § 652.210(12) (West effective Jan. 1, 2019). 
 308.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149 § 105A (effective Jan. 1, 2018).   
 309.  Bureau of Lab. & Indus. v. City of Roseburg, 706 P.2d 956, 959 & n.2 (Or. App. 1985) 
(holding also that because “‘substantially similar work’ is a stricter test than ‘comparable work,’” 
plaintiff’s “[p]roof of a violation of the stricter ‘substantially similar’ test necessarily proves a vio-
lation of [the statute]”). 
 310.  Smith v. Bull Run Sch. Dist., 722 P.2d 27, 29 (Or. App 1986). 
 311.  OR. REV. STAT. § 652.220(2) (West effective Jan. 1, 2019) (listing factors of: “(a) A sen-
iority system; (b) A merit system; (c) A system that measures earnings by quantity or quality of 
production, including piece-rate work; (d) Workplace locations; (e) Travel, if travel is necessary 
and regular for the employee; (f) Education; (g) Training; (h) Experience; or (i) Any combination 
of the factors described in this subsection, if the combination of factors accounts for the entire com-
pensation differential.”)  
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from “[d]etermin[ing] compensation for a position based on current or past 
compensation of a prospective employee.”312 
Lastly, and again most strikingly, Oregon’s new equal pay statute pro-
hibits compensation discrimination based on any “protected class” as defined 
by the statute, including not only sex (as all state equal pay statutes do) and 
race (as California’s new equal pay statute does), but also “color, religion, 
sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital status, veteran status, disabil-
ity or age.”313  Indeed, as with all other state versions of Title VII, Oregon’s 
existing antidiscrimination laws prohibit employment discrimination on the 
basis of these protected classes,314 but such a lawsuit typically requires the 
employee to bear the burden of proving an employer’s intentional discrimi-
nation.  By adding all protected classes to the state’s separate equal pay stat-
ute, the Oregon legislature has placed the burden of persuasion on the em-
ployer to justify disparate pay among employees performing comparable 
work where the disparity is not just between men and women, but between 
members of any protected class. 
By building upon existing statutory text and precedent with amendments 
that now define “work of comparable character,” include statutory protec-
tions for pay differentials based on any protected class status, and limit af-
firmative defenses to only those bona fide and excluding prior salary, the 
Oregon state equal pay act now offers the most comprehensive model for 
closing both gender and racial pay gaps at work. 
Notably, while Massachusetts, California, and Oregon have passed the 
most wide-reaching new state equal pay laws, many other states are consid-
ering their own amendments to state law.  In the 2017 legislative session 
alone, legislators in forty-two states introduced at least one bill with the pur-
pose of narrowing the wage gap, and more modest amendments (for example, 
banning consideration of prior salary in pay-setting) were passed in Colo-
rado, Delaware, and Nevada.315  As of publication in March 2018, legislators 
in New Jersey had passed a broad-based amendment to their state equal pay 
law that, if enacted by the Governor, would prohibit unequal pay based on 
any protected class for “substantially similar” work—similar to Oregon’s ap-
proach.316   
                                                 
 312.  OR. REV. STAT. § 652.220(1)(d) (West effective Jan. 1, 2019). 
 313.  OR. REV. STAT. § 652.210 (5); 652.220(1)(a) (West effective Jan. 1, 2019). 
 314.  See OR. REV. STAT. § 659a.001 (2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 174.100 (2015). 
 315.  See Kate Nielson, States Notch Multiple Equal Pay Victories in 2017, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. 
WOMEN (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.aauw.org/2017/10/13/state-equal-pay-victories-in-2017.  
 316.  See Christian Hetrick, New Jersey Lawmakers Overwhelmingly Pass Pay Equity Bill, 
OBSERVER (Mar. 26, 2018), http://observer.com/2018/03/new-jersey-lawmakers-overwhelmingly-
pass-pay-equity-bill/; A1/S104, 218th Leg. (N.J. 2018). 
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It is clear that the issue of equal pay and the inability of existing law to 
redress the gender pay gap has become a key legislative priority at the state 
level.  To date, however, only four states have passed significant recent re-
forms to their equal pay statutes, and thirteen others have room for interpre-
tation of their statutory language that allows for broader-based comparisons 
in pay discrimination cases that go beyond federal law’s threshold require-
ment of comparing “equal work.”  Reform at the federal level is a near im-
possibility for the immediate future due to the Republican control of Con-
gress and the White House.  Yet even without widespread legislative change, 
advances in the law of sex stereotyping under Title VII and examples of em-
ployers who are, themselves, instituting comparable work efforts provide an 
opportunity to reframe and reinterpret existing law. 
IV.  REDEFINING EQUAL WORK 
Gender and racial pay gaps have been stubbornly persistent, and im-
provement in these measures stalled for decades.  Such gaps reflect a serious 
shortcoming in policy efforts to advance social justice; they also exacerbate 
the current problem of income inequality.  Given the nascent state of legisla-
tive reform efforts (and the current political climate at the federal level), this 
Part offers doctrinal and theoretical suggestions to reframe and reinterpret 
existing law prohibiting pay discrimination.  The goal is to push back on the 
federal courts’ unnecessarily crabbed interpretations of a “comparator” under 
Title VII and of “equal work” under the Equal Pay Act.  To do so, this Part 
draws on both advances in the legal theory of sex stereotyping under Title 
VII and examples from employment practices in the union, government, and 
private sectors to show how current precedent opens the door to broader com-
parisons of equivalent work in pay discrimination cases. 
This Part also seeks to debunk the outdated and inaccurate critique that 
interpreting the law in a way that can reach the disadvantages caused by labor 
market forces or workforce segregation is somehow requiring employers to 
compare and pay equal wages for “apples and oranges.”317  Both broader in-
terpretations of “equal work” under the Equal Pay Act and broader state stat-
utory requirements of equal pay for “substantially similar” or “comparable” 
work318 seek, rather, to compare different kinds of apples—for example, red 
apples and green apples.  By maintaining a focus on equivalent job criteria 
and requirements within one employer’s business operations, the law can 
take a reasonable and incremental step forward to account for discrimination 
                                                 
 317.  See supra note 36 and accompanying text.  
 318.  Here I refer to comparable “work,” not “worth.”  See supra note 241–242 and accompany-
ing text. 
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and segregation in the labor market rather than throwing up its hands in def-
erence to what employers have done in the past.  This Part then concludes by 
considering counterarguments. 
A.  A New Framework for What Constitutes Equal Work 
While, to date, most judicial precedent has interpreted federal and state 
equal pay act requirements of equal pay for “equal work” narrowly, over the 
past decade, advances in the legal theory of sex stereotyping under Title VII 
and voluntary efforts by employers provide an opportunity to reexamine ex-
isting interpretations. 
1.  Advances in Stereotype Theory under Title VII 
As described previously, in the 1980s, federal courts were unreceptive 
to arguments about comparable worth under Title VII.  Yet advances in the 
legal theory of sex stereotyping since then provide cause for reconsideration.  
Notably, the Spaulding and AFSCME cases were decided by the Ninth Circuit 
prior to another influential case, the United States Supreme Court’s decision 
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.319  In Price Waterhouse, the Court held that, 
when highly successful accountant Ann Hopkins was denied a promotion to 
partnership because she did not conform to a feminine gender stereotype, she 
could allege sex discrimination under Title VII.320  Hopkins was told that, “to 
improve her chances for partnership,” she should “walk more femininely, talk 
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, 
and wear jewelry.”321  This, the Court held, could constitute sex discrimina-
tion because, “[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals 
because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”322  In 
the nearly two decades since the Price Waterhouse decision, the sex stereo-
type theory has grown dramatically in development and application—so 
much so that, in recent years, it has been applied by some federal courts to 
prohibit sex discrimination against male caregivers and to hold that discrim-
ination based on transgender status is sex discrimination per se.323 
The development of the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping theory of-
fers two doctrinal advances that may be applied to strengthen equal pay 
                                                 
 319.  490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 320.  Id. at 258. 
 321.  Id. at 235 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985), 
aff’d, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). 
 322.  Id. at 251 (quoting Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 
n.13 (1978)). 
 323.  See Bornstein, supra note 151, at 919; Stephanie Bornstein, The Law of Gender Stereotyp-
ing and the Work-Family Conflicts of Men, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1297 (2012). 
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claims even under existing law.  First, for pay discrimination claims alleged 
under Title VII, courts in stereotyping cases have held that a plaintiff suc-
cessfully created an inference of discrimination even without being able to 
point to a direct comparator.324  For example, when a school psychologist, 
Elana Back, was denied tenure because her supervisors believed the fact that 
she was a mother of two young children was incompatible with her job, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that she could 
create an inference of discrimination even without pointing to “similarly sit-
uated men” that had been treated better.325  According to the Court, the deci-
sionmakers’ “stereotypical remarks about the incompatibility of motherhood 
and employment” were enough for Back to meet her burden of proof: “stere-
otyping of women as caregivers can by itself and without more be evidence 
of an impermissible, sex-based motive.”326  This was an important holding 
because of the fact that Back worked in a predominantly female occupation: 
85% of the school’s teachers were women and 71% were mothers.327 
Federal courts deciding pay discrimination claims alleged under Title 
VII should hold similarly.  If there is evidence that a plaintiff’s pay was in-
fected by sex discrimination or sex stereotypes about the plaintiff or the po-
sition, to be consistent with the post-Price Waterhouse line of cases, a plain-
tiff should be able to successfully create an inference of discrimination under 
Title VII, even without being able to point to a near identical comparator. 
Second, for pay discrimination claims alleged under the Equal Pay Act, 
the knowledge gained in nearly two decades of sex stereotyping jurispru-
dence under Title VII can and should be applied where applicable to EPA 
claims as well.  In the context of meeting the first threshold for EPA claims—
that the plaintiff is performing “equal work”—where relevant, plaintiffs 
should identify and challenge any sex stereotyping that affected the em-
ployer’s perception of whether the jobs are “equal.” 
In addition, sex stereotype theory as applied in Title VII can and should 
be used to challenge an employer’s defense that a pay differential is based on 
a “factor other than sex” when that factor is impermissibly tied to sex stere-
otyping.328  Certain cases decided under the existing EPA have recognized 
and applied this approach.  For example, a federal court recognized stereo-
typing and reinstated an EPA claim by a group of mostly female nurse prac-
titioners who were paid less than mostly male physician assistants for doing 
“fungible” and “interchangeable” work, despite the fact that wages were set 
                                                 
 324.  See Bornstein, supra note 151, at 945–54; Goldberg, supra note 154, at 794. 
 325.  Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 121 (2d Cir. 2004); 
Bornstein, supra note 151, at 947. 
 326.  Back, 365 F.3d at 122; Bornstein, supra note 151, at 947. 
 327.  See Back, 365 F.3d at 122; Bornstein, supra note 151, at 947. 
 328.  See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
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according to a Veteran’s Affairs pay scale that treated the positions differ-
ently.329  Similarly, while prior salaries and prevailing labor market rates are 
generally acceptable defenses, several cases have held that, without some ad-
ditional reason, such as a difficult negotiation and crucial need for recruiting, 
defending pay disparities based on those reasons alone or leaving disparities 
in place after the recruitment may violate the EPA.330  And, in recent cases, 
federal courts have held that a male employee’s ability to negotiate a higher 
salary may not constitute a “factor other than sex,”331 which comports with 
social science data showing that women may be disadvantaged by sex stere-
otypes around assertiveness and negotiation.332 
These types of stereotype-associated factors could affect the racial pay 
gap as well.  A vast literature documents that when pay setting involves ne-
gotiation, women are disadvantaged;333 studies show that racial minorities 
may be disadvantaged similarly, so that “the context of the job negotiation 
itself is partly responsible for the salary gap.”334  Researchers in one study 
attributed this disadvantage to the process of “racial socialization,” whereby 
“Black employees, relative to other racial and ethnic groups, are more likely 
to be taught at an early age that life is unfair” and taught “the importance of 
                                                 
 329.  See Beck-Wilson v. Principi, 441 F.3d 353, 360, 363 (6th Cir. 2006).  
 330.  See, e.g., King v. Acosta Sales & Mktg., Inc., 678 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2012); Leather-
wood v. Anna’s Linens Co., 384 Fed. App’x 853, 860 (11th Cir. 2010); Mulhall v. Advance Sec., 
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 331.  See Thibodeaux-Woody v. Houst. Cmty. Coll., 593 Fed. App’x 280, 283–85 (5th Cir. 
2014); Dreves v. Hudson Grp. Retail, LLC, 2013 WL 2634429, at *8 (D. Vt. 2013).  
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F. Stuhlmacher & Amy E. Walters, Gender Differences in Negotiation Outcome: A Meta-analysis, 
52 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 653 (1999). 
 333.  See, e.g., supra note 332.  
 334.  Morela Hernandez & Derek R. Avery, Getting the Short End of the Stick: Racial Bias in 
Salary Negotiations, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (June 15, 2016), http://sloanreview.mit.edu/arti-
cle/getting-the-short-end-of-the-stick-racial-bias-in-salary-negotiations/ (citing studies including 
Derek R. Avery, Racial Differences in Perceptions of Starting Salaries: How Failing to Discrimi-
nate Can Perpetuate Discrimination, 17 J. BUS. & PSYCHOL. 439 (2003); Jeff Dominitz & Charles 
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racial identity [to] prepare them for bias that it may provoke.”335  Thus, black 
employees are disadvantaged by “misalignment” of perceptions when nego-
tiating salaries.336 
To be consistent with existing precedent under Title VII, if an employer 
defends an EPA violation by claiming “unequal work” or a “factor other than 
sex,” and that comparison or factor involves sex stereotyping, the factor 
should, itself, be “evidence of an impermissible, sex-based motive”337—in 
the words of the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse, impermissible “dispar-
ate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”338  Like-
wise, where pay-setting can be shown to be infected with racial stereotyping, 
that constitutes unlawful race discrimination in compensation under Title 
VII. 
2.  New Models for Comparators 
Perhaps the greatest challenge to overcoming the portion of the pay gap 
due to workforce segregation is the need to provide a near identical compar-
ator who is paid more for doing “equal work” under Title VII or the EPA.339  
Yet, employers in a variety of employment contexts provide examples of the 
ability to set similar pay for different jobs that require similar background 
credentials, effort, and responsibility.  Employers in union, government, and 
even private sectors provide examples upon which a plaintiff alleging pay 
discrimination should be able to draw to meet the legal test of “equal work” 
under the EPA or a “comparator” under Title VII. 
a.  Union Sector 
The union sector provides many models for achieving pay equity despite 
varied jobs within an organization.  Because the goal of union representation 
is to protect the interests of all workers equally, the process for setting pay is 
more routinized, with a focus on objective criteria applied consistently across 
                                                 
 335.  Hernandez & Avery, supra note 334 (citing Diane Hughes, Correlates of African American 
and Latino Parents’ Messages to Children About Ethnicity and Race: A Comparative Study of Ra-
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 338.  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & 
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).  
 339.  See supra Parts II.A. & II.B. 
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workers and positions within a bargaining unit.340  In addition, having an ex-
pectation of equality and a bargaining process brings information about 
wages and how they are set “into the open,” increasing pay transparency as a 
matter of course in the union context341—a key focus of some current pay 
equity reform efforts.342 
For example, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees (“AFSCME”), the major union representing public sector em-
ployees in the United States (and the plaintiff in an early comparable worth 
case), has identified how to improve pay equity within an organization by 
seeking a “job evaluation study” of positions within an organization that 
keeps an eye out for sex segregation.343  If that proves too burdensome for 
the employer, AFSCME suggests enforcing any past pay studies conducted 
by the employer or modifying a similar study from a different “jurisdiction” 
to fit the needs of a workplace.344  As AFSCME describes it, a job evaluation 
study should “compare jobs or job classifications within one employer, not 
with those of other employers” and should “look[] at job classifications,” “the 
qualifications required to do the job,” and “the duties and responsibilities that 
are assigned to a job,” not “at how well or poorly an employee performs these 
duties” or “at the qualifications that an individual employee who is currently 
performing a job may have.”345  According to AFSCME, the most common 
method for evaluating jobs is the “point-factor method,” which assigns points 
to various “compensable factors,” including skill (“the experience, training, 
education and ability required to do a job”), effort (“the physical or mental 
exertion needed to perform a job”), responsibility (“the extent to which em-
ployees are accountable for the work they do”), and working conditions (“the 
physical surroundings and hazards of a job”).346  Factors can be weighted and 
                                                 
 340.  See JULIE ANDERSON ET AL., INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RES., THE STATUS OF WOMEN 
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assigned different steps or levels, all of which are converted into a point sys-
tem; pay is then set by points.347 
Such a system allows an employer to compare and set the same pay for 
different jobs that have the same number of points.  For example, in one 
AFSCME collective bargaining agreement for state workers in Iowa, the pay 
grade was the same for, among other positions, Accountant 2, Audiologist, 
Boiler Inspector, and Clinical Dietician.348  In another, for city workers in 
Detroit the same pay rate was assigned to Electronic Equipment Repair 
Worker, First Aid Station Nurse, Social Counselor, and Pharmacy Techni-
cian.349  As AFSCME notes, a job evaluation study need not be an additional 
burden to an employer as “[m]ost mid- and large-sized employers already use 
a job evaluation system for many human resource functions.”350  While critics 
may argue that such a point system seems to imply assessments of compara-
ble worth, the focus here is still on an objective measure of job duties, skills, 
and requirements, and not on any general sense of the job’s intrinsic “value” 
to the employer.351 
In part as a result of these and other union practices that track and set 
pay across employees, the gender and racial pay gaps among unionized work-
ers are far smaller than those of the entire U.S. workforce.  One study docu-
mented that full-time working women who are union members earn, on av-
erage, 31% more than women whose jobs are not unionized.352  This 
translates into a significantly smaller gender pay gap: women who are mem-
bers of a union earn nearly $0.88 on the dollar to men,353 which slashes the 
                                                 
 347.  See id. 
 348.  2005–2007 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN STATE OF IOWA AND 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 61 AFL-
CIO 107–09 (2005), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2422&con-
text=blscontracts (last visited Mar. 12, 2018).  
 349.  1998–2001 MASTER AGREEMENT: CITY OF DETROIT/AFSCME, MICHIGAN COUNCIL 25, 
at 139–44 (1998), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2448&con-
text=blscontracts (last visited Mar. 12, 2018). 
 350.  How is a Pay Equity Study Conducted?, supra note 345. 
 351.  See Eisenberg, Shattering, supra note 182, at 55; supra notes 241–242 and accompanying 
text (discussing difference between comparable “worth” and comparable “work”). 
 352.  ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 340, at 4–5 (citing JANELLE JONES ET AL., WOMEN, 
WORKING FAMILIES, AND UNIONS (2014)). 
 353.  Id. at 4–5, tbl.2 (citing BUREAU LABOR STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, MEDIAN WEEKLY 
EARNINGS OF FULL-TIME WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS BY UNION AFFILIATION AND SELECTED 
CHARACTERISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t02.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2018)). 
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current average pay gap of all women ($0.80 on the dollar) by 40%.354  An-
other study estimated that unionized women’s gender pay gap was half that 
of non-unionized women.355 
Unionized employees also see improvement in the racial pay gap: the 
median weekly pay for unionized Latino workers is about 40% higher than 
those who are not unionized; for African Americans, about 30% higher.356  
For women of color, this translates into a significant narrowing in their pay 
gap—a gain of between $0.07 and $0.14 on the dollar, according to one 
study.357 
Of course, union membership is at an all-time low: in 2016, just 6.4% 
of private sector workers and 10.7% of the U.S. workforce overall (including 
public sector workers) belonged to a union358—a massive decline from the 
mid-1950s rate of 35%.359  This means that any direct improvement in the 
pay gaps created by union practices will have a very limited impact on the 
pay gaps of the U.S. workforce overall.  Also, creating pay bands is not a 
cure-all: the discretion to set pay higher or lower within a set pay range may 
still be infected by gender or racial stereotypes or implicit biases such that, 
even among jobs assigned the same pay range, those jobs predominantly per-
formed by women or racial minorities may be paid on the lower end of that 
range.360 
Nevertheless, the ability of unionized employers to take a broader com-
parative view when setting pay rates is a starting point that has helped reduce 
                                                 
 354.  See supra note 47 (regarding overall gender pay gap of $.80 on the dollar).  An improve-
ment of $0.08 on the dollar closes the $0.20 gap by 40%. 
 355.  KATHERINE GALLAGHER ROBBINS & ANDREA JOHNSON, UNION MEMBERSHIP IS 
CRITICAL FOR EQUAL PAY, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. 1 (2016), https://nwlc.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/02/Union-Membership-is-Critical-for-Equal-Pay.pdf (estimating an 11% improvement 
over the $0.20 wage gap for median weekly wages of unionized to nonunionized women).  
 356.  See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 340, at 4–5, tbl.2 (Hispanic women 42.1%, Hispanic 
men 40.6%, Black women 33.6%, Black men 28.5% (citing BUREAU LABOR STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, MEDIAN WEEKLY EARNINGS OF FULL-TIME WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS BY UNION 
AFFILIATION AND SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t02.htm 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2018))). 
 357.  ROBBINS & JOHNSON, supra note 355, at 1 (explaining the gap between unionized and 
nonunionized workers narrows from a $0.34 to $0.27 gap between African American women and 
white men, $0.40 to $0.26 gap between Latina women and white men). 
 358.  See News Release: Union Members—2016, U.S. BUREAU LABOR STAT. (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. 
 359.  See Steven Greenhouse, Union Membership in U.S. Fell to a 70-Year Low Last Year, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/business/22union.html. 
 360.  See, e.g., Guild to WSJ: Yes, There Is a Wage Gap, THE NEWSGUILD-COMMUNICATION 
WORKERS OF AMERICA (July 12, 2017), http://www.newsguild.org/mediaguild3/guild-to-wsj-yes-
there-is-a-wage-gap/; see also Ramachandran, supra note 257, at 1066 n.89 (2012) (explaining that, 
“if a very large range of salaries is permitted for a particular pay grade, so that pay need not be 
uniform, then disclosing the pay scale [alone] would be insufficient to [notify] employees of unfair 
compensation decisions occurring within those ranges”). 
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the gender and racial pay gaps among unionized workers.  It also provides 
examples for non-unionized employees challenging existing legal definitions 
of “equal work” or similarly situated “comparators” in lawsuits alleging un-
equal pay.  While a pay discrimination claim looks at only the pay practices 
of the employer against whom the claim has been made, evidence that other 
employers within the same industry with the same job categories have taken 
a broader view of what jobs deserve equal pay ranges may help a plaintiff 
create an inference of stereotyping or discrimination within the firm. 
b.  Federal Government Sector 
As with the example of some unionized jobs, federal government jobs 
rely on job classifications that assign points based on job requirements and 
criteria; the points are then translated into a pay grade.  Each job in the federal 
government is assigned a “General Service” or “GS” grade number between 
1 and 15, and within each GS rating there are 10 steps of pay until the job is 
bumped up to the next group.361  As the U.S. Office of Personnel Manage-
ment explains it: 
Agencies establish (classify) the grade of each job based on the 
level of difficulty, responsibility, and qualifications required.  In-
dividuals with a high school diploma and no additional experience 
typically qualify for GS-2 positions; those with a Bachelor’s de-
gree for GS-5 positions; and those with a Master’s degree for GS-
9 positions.362 
In 2018, pay for Grade 1 ranged from $18,785 (Step 1) to $23,502 (Step 
10); for Grade 15, it ranged from $105,123 (Step 1) to $136,659 (Step 10).363  
This provides another example of a system that allows an employer to com-
pare non-identical jobs—jobs that may be mostly held in the U.S. economy 
by members of one sex—and, nevertheless, set pay similarly.  For example, 
a recent search of postings on the federal jobs listing website USAJobs sought 
applications for a variety of positions all paid at the GS-10 level, including 
                                                 
 361.  See Pay & Leave Systems: General Schedule Classification and Pay, U.S. OFFICE OF 
PERSONNEL MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/pay-systems/general-
schedule (last visited Mar. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Pay & Leave].  High-level executive and re-
searcher positions with the government may exceed GS-15 as part of the “Senior Level Service.”  
See also Senior Executive Service: Scientific & Senior Level Positions, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL 
MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/senior-executive-service/scientific-senior-
level-positions (last visited Mar. 12, 2018). 
 362.  See Pay & Leave, supra note 361. 
 363.  Salary Table 2018-GS, Annual Rates by Grade and Step, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL 
MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/salary-tables/18Ta-
bles/html/GS.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2018). 
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Legal Assistant, Clinical Nurse, Engineering Technician, and Physical Secu-
rity Specialist.364 
As with union members, the gender pay gap among federal sector work-
ers is far smaller than those of the entire U.S. workforce.  According to one 
study, in 2012, GS-ranked female workers earned $0.89 to the dollar of all 
men365—similar to the gap for unionized women ($0.88 on the dollar),366 and 
nearly half the gap for all women ($0.80 on the dollar).367  Again as with 
union employers, establishing pay grades is not a magic bullet: setting pay 
from a possible range for jobs assigned to the same pay grade may continue 
to be affected by stereotyping and bias, but it provides a starting point.368  Yet 
federal sector pay grades also provide another set of potential “comparators” 
by analogy for private sector workers: if the federal government can compare 
different occupations requiring the same level of qualifications and work du-
ties, private employers that provide similar services with similar job catego-
ries can do so, too. 
c.  Private Sector 
The most compelling examples for the argument that private employers 
can and should be held to broader comparisons of “equal work” under the 
EPA are those of private employers who have done so themselves.  The most 
notable and successful example is Salesforce.com, the company whose vol-
untary efforts led to the Obama White House Equal Pay Pledge.369  Despite 
being “initially skeptical” of any pay disparity at the company, Salesforce 
                                                 
 364.  Original search conducted by the author in February 2018, of USAJobs.com using pay 
grade filter for GS-10, https://www.usajobs.gov/Search/?g=10&k=GS-
10&gs=true&p=1&smin=54803&smax=71247. 
 365.  U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., GOVERNMENTWIDE STRATEGY ON ADVANCING PAY 
EQUALITY IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 12 (2014) https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-over-
sight/pay-leave/reference-materials/reports/governmentwide-strategy-on-advancing-pay-equality-
in-the-federal-government.pdf. 
 366.  See supra notes 353–355 and accompanying text. 
 367.  See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 368.  See supra note 360 and accompanying text.  See, e.g., U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., 
GOVERNMENTWIDE STRATEGY ON ADVANCING PAY EQUALITY IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 2 
(2014), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/reference-materials/reports/Govern-
mentwide-Strategy-on-Advancing-Pay-Equality-in-the-Federal-Government.pdf (reporting the 
finding that, “[f]or GS employees, a discretionary authority to set pay for new hires above the step 
1 minimum rate was used more frequently . . . for males than females in all 3 study years . . . [and] 
that these actions are most heavily used in three occupational categories that are male-dominated”); 
Alexia Fernandez Campbell, One Way to Ensure Equal Pay for Men and Women, ATLANTIC (Nov. 
1, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/11/how-the-government-mostly-
closed-its-gender-pay-gap/506084/.   
 369.  See supra notes 271–274 and accompanying text. 
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CEO Marc Benioff undertook this effort after two female employees sug-
gested that women were being paid less than men.370  Starting in August 
2015, Salesforce conducted a voluntary audit of its more than 17,000 em-
ployees, to, according to the company, “determine if men and women were 
paid equally for comparable work.”371  To do so, the company “put employ-
ees in comparable roles into groups and analyzed salaries of those groups to 
determine whether there were statistically significant wage differences be-
tween women and men.”372  The company “based [its] analysis on objective 
factors that determine pay, such as job function, level and location[,]” then 
corrected “unexplained differences” by adjusting salaries for a group of both 
male and female employees alike.373 
Because some of the pay adjustments the company made raised the pay 
of men, one commentator suggested that one could “assume there [were] eq-
uity increases embedded in that number that impact diverse male employ-
ees,” in a workforce composed of 70% men and 30% women, only 8% of 
whom were Hispanic, black, or mixed race.374  As a result, Salesforce ad-
justed the salaries of 6% of its workforce to achieve gender pay equity, in-
vesting almost $3 million to do so.375  
The Salesforce example shows not that the law should require affirma-
tive and costly measures, but, instead, that the law can and should recognize 
the ability of private sector employers to make comparisons among and be-
tween different occupations that require similar credentials and skills.  Ac-
cording to Benioff, “look[ing] at if [the company is] paying men and women 
the same” is “something every single CEO can do today . . . [w]e all have 
modern human resource management systems.”376  Far from requiring a com-
plicated and unattainable comparison between apples and oranges, the 
Salesforce examples prove that comparing occupations is more akin to com-
paring different types of apples—and entirely possible for a private sector 
employer to do.  Other companies, including SAP, have undertaken similar 
                                                 
 370.  Bourree Lam, One Tech Company Just Erased Its Gender Pay Gap, ATLANTIC (Nov. 10, 
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/11/salesforce-equal-pay-gender-
gap/415050/. 
 371.  Cindy Robbins, Equality at Salesforce: The Equal Pay Assessment Update, SALESFORCE 
BLOG (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.salesforce.com/blog/2016/03/equality-at-salesforce-equal-
pay.html. 
 372.  Id. 
 373.  Id.  
 374.  Kris Dunn, The Salesforce Pitch for Equity Equality, WORKFORCE MAG. (Jan. 21, 2017), 
https://www.workforce.com/2017/01/21/salesforce-pitch-equity-equality/. 
 375.  See Robbins, supra note 371.  
 376.  Claire Zillman, Salesforce’s Marc Benioff Urges His Fellow CEOs to Close the Gender 
Pay Gap, FORTUNE (Jan. 18, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/18/salesforce-ceo-marc-benioff-
gender-pay-gap/. 
 642 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:581 
 
efforts to compare pay across jobs in a more equitable manner.377  These 
companies provide evidence that, just because two employees do not perform 
the same job, they can still be performing “equal work” for which they are 
paid equally. 
As examples from union, federal government, and some private sector 
employers now show, by applying some simple objective parameters, em-
ployers—and courts—can and should take a broader view of “equal work” 
or an appropriate “comparator” than currently recognized under existing fed-
eral antidiscrimination law.  An employee alleging pay discrimination under 
Title VII or the Equal Pay Act should be able to make similar within-em-
ployer comparisons. 
B.  The Argument for Substantially Similar or Comparable Work 
Developments in the law of stereotyping and new examples of employ-
ers’ efforts provide the opportunity to push current interpretations of existing 
federal and state laws requiring “equal work” further.  Yet seventeen state 
equal pay statutes now require equal pay for “comparable,” “substantially 
similar,” or something else broader than “equal” work,378 and legislators in 
many more states may move in that direction in the near future.379  This pro-
vides the opportunity for recognizing a wider range of allowable comparisons 
in equal pay claims. 
Given what we now know about stereotyping and implicit bias, and the 
continued prevalence of gender workforce segregation, a more modern and 
reasonable reframing of equal pay law is long overdue.  Title VII and the 
EPA have failed to close the gender pay gap, and improvement has been 
stalled for nearly two decades.  Developing tools to overcome this problem 
is essential.  Recognizing the impact of implicit bias and stereotyping on our 
ability to make comparisons in law is not a new phenomenon, and has been 
raised in a variety of legal contexts, including jury selection, criminal sen-
tencing, employment discrimination, and more.380  The chief argument 
against strengthening equal pay laws to close the pay gap is that employers 
should not be required to make comparisons among different types of jobs.  
But law is entirely a field of comparisons: lawyers argue cases by applying 
                                                 
 377.  See, e.g., Vanessa Fuhrmans, SAP Goes After the Gender Pay Gap, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sap-goes-after-the-gender-pay-gap-1502676120. 
 378.  See supra Part II.C. 
 379.  See supra Part III.C. 
 380.  See, e.g., CHERYL STAATS, ET AL., STATE OF THE SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW, 
KIRWIN INST., OHIO ST. UNIV. (4th ed. 2016), http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/07/implicit-bias-2016.pdf (summarizing recent research); PROJECT IMPLICIT, “Publica-
tions,” http://projectimplicit.net/papers.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2018) (providing list of the pro-
ject researchers’ many publications). 
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precedent to their new facts; businesses know how to approach new business 
settings by analogy to how the law applies to existing situations. 
Interpreting Title VII and the EPA to require plaintiffs to demonstrate 
“virtually identical” jobs or comparators in any claim of unequal pay is an 
outdated and unnecessarily limited vision of antidiscrimination law.  A sur-
vey of published federal court decisions in Equal Pay Act cases in which the 
court directly addressed the threshold requirement of whether men and 
women performed “equal work” reveals significant room for improvement 
and increased doctrinal consistency.  Out of seventy-nine published decisions 
in which a federal district court, circuit court of appeal, or the United States 
Supreme Court directly considered the issue, just over one-quarter of plain-
tiffs (twenty-one) were found to be performing “equal work” to their com-
parators—meaning that nearly three-quarters of these plaintiffs never made 
it out of the starting gate with their legal claims.381  Of those found to be 
“equal,” most were performing identical jobs to their male comparators—for 
example, male and female computer technical writers,382 health spa chain 
managers paid different commissions,383 female employees who filled vacan-
cies for male school maintenance workers,384 business school professors 
within the same department at a private university,385 and a male attorney 
who replaced his female predecessor in the exact same position (and was paid 
20% more).386  Other successful plaintiffs were performing nearly identical 
jobs, but with different job titles that impacted employer pay setting—for 
example, airline stewardesses (female) and pursers (male),387 sewing ma-
chine operators (female) and bookbinders (male),388 nurse’s aides (female) 
and hospital orderlies (male),389 and housekeepers (female) and custodians 
(male).390  Because these cases are consistent with even the narrowest inter-
pretation of “equal work” in existing law, these results are to be expected. 
                                                 
 381.  Original survey of caselaw conducted by the author in November 2017 of all federal court 
cases under the Equal Pay Act that discussed the definition of “equal work.”  Because many EPA 
cases are decided without addressing this issue, the survey is not intended to be reliably quantitative, 
but rather to provide some context and qualitative examples of federal courts’ application of the 
“equal work” test. 
 382.  See Meeks v. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, 15 F.3d 1013 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 383.  See Bence v. Detroit Health Corp., 712 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 384.  See Marshall v. Bldg. Maint. Corp., 587 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 385.  See Klein v. New York University, 786 F. Supp. 2d 830 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 386.  See Dubowsky v. Stern, Lavinthal, Norgaard & Daly, 922 F. Supp. 985 (D.N.J. 1996). 
 387.  See, e.g., Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 740 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 388.  See Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 389.  See, e.g., Odomes v. Nucare, Inc., 653 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1981); Brennan v. Prince William 
Hosp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1974); Hodgson v. Maison Miramon, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 843 
(E.D. La. 1972). 
 390.  See, e.g., Hodgson v. Montana State Bd. of Ed., 336 F. Supp. 524 (D. Mont. 1972). 
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In a handful of cases, courts even read the “equal work” requirement 
slightly more generously to reach the greater potential of existing law under 
the EPA.  For example, despite being in different college departments, when 
the actual factors used to set pay were compared, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a female criminal justice professor 
was performing “equal work” (with equal “skill, effort, responsibility”) as a 
male psychology professor, despite their difference in fields.391  Likewise, 
the District Court of Minnesota held that a female higher education and re-
search officer was performing “equal work” to a male innovation and busi-
ness officer when looking at their job descriptions and duties, which required 
similar relationship-building skills, levels of expertise, and effort.392  As these 
two cases demonstrate, there is, indeed, room even under existing law for 
federal courts to compare different types of jobs that require similar hiring 
criteria and equivalent skills, duties, and responsibilities. 
Yet these decisions were the very limited exception to the general rule: 
federal courts take a circumscribed view of “equal work” under the EPA that 
allows differences between employees holding equivalent jobs to justify pay 
disparities between equivalent jobs.393  Among the fifty-eight cases in which 
federal courts found that plaintiffs and their comparators were not performing 
“equal work” were those in which jobs with equivalent duties were found 
unequal because: male and female employees had their pay set through dif-
ferent processes and performed a few different tasks394; male employees per-
forming the same job duties had additional training, though the duties per-
formed did not require it395; employees performed the same job in different 
offices or locations396; or because, while some male employees performing 
the same job duties were paid more than female employees, other male em-
ployees were not.397  Under existing law, such results are also to be expected.  
Requiring comparators to work “in the same establishment” and to be “equal” 
creates a narrow perspective that allows courts to use any difference in the 
                                                 
 391.  See Lavin-McEleney v. Marist Coll., 239 F.3d 476 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 392.  See Ewald v. Royal Norwegian Embassy, 82 F. Supp. 3d 871 (D. Minn. 2014). 
 393.  See also What is Pay Equity?, supra note 336; Eisenberg, Shattering, supra note 182, at 
48-49. 
 394.  See, e.g., Goodrich v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 815 F.2d 1519 (1987). 
 395.  See, e.g., Foco v. Freudenberg-Nok Gen. P’ship, 549 F. App’x 340, 343 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(“The [district] court noted that under applicable regulations ‘skill’ includes factors such as ‘expe-
rience, training, education, and ability’ [and] Plaintiff could not establish that she performed work 
equal to the male comparators because they had more experience and, in some cases, possessed 
credentials that Plaintiff did not have.”)I; Johnson v. FedEx, 604 F. App’x 183 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 396.  See, e.g., Foster v. Arcata Assocs., Inc., 772 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1985); Renstrom v. Nash 
Finch Co., 787 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Minn. 2011).  
 397.  See, e.g., Moccio v. Cornell University, 889 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Cole v. 
Ruidoso Mun. Sch., 43 F.3d 1373 (10th Cir. 1994). 
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comparators to dismiss a plaintiff’s EPA case before ever asking the em-
ployer to justify the disparity.  The inquiry then becomes backward-looking: 
just because the employees holding the positions now have differences does 
not mean that the jobs, themselves, require unequal skill, effort, and respon-
sibility. 
Under a “substantially similar” or “comparable” work standard, the 
threshold inquiry to make out a prima facie case of unequal pay focuses more 
properly on whether the job duties of plaintiffs and their comparators should 
be compared due to similarities in the jobs, themselves.  It removes poten-
tially irrelevant characteristics like geographic location and additional train-
ing from the threshold inquiry of whether the positions are, in the first place, 
substantially similar, and reserves those inquiries for the employer’s affirm-
ative defenses.  Indeed, all three amended state laws in Massachusetts, Cali-
fornia, and Oregon do just that, considering the substantial similarity of jobs 
across an employer’s operations, without reference to “in the same establish-
ment,” but then allowing an employer’s affirmative defense to a pay disparity 
to include geographic location, where bona fide.398  An employer may well 
be justified in paying a male employee in its city office more than it pays a 
female employee who performs the same job in its rural office—for example, 
due to a legitimate difference in the local cost of living or bona fide differ-
ences in the offices’ operations.  But this is an inquiry better undertaken as a 
matter of an employer’s defense; not every office location requires disparate 
pay, and the employee should get a chance to question whether such differ-
ences are warranted. 
Likewise, each of the new laws in Massachusetts, California, and Ore-
gon makes clear that the experience, education, and training level of an em-
ployee performing a given job does not determine whether the jobs are sub-
stantially similar.  Instead, those inquiries are, again, properly considered as 
the employer’s affirmative defenses if bona fide and related to the job, not in 
assessing whether the jobs themselves are comparable.399  This means that 
any pay differences for additional training, education, and experience that are 
truly related to the job and of value to the employer may be excused, while 
simply using the fact that one employee has additional criteria not required 
by the job to explain an unwarranted disparity will not. 
                                                 
 398.  See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5 (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A (2018); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 652.220(2)(b) (2017).  Note that geographic location and “working conditions” 
are conceptually distinct.  Removing geographic location from the threshold inquiry does not nec-
essarily remove the threshold requirement of comparable or substantially similar “working condi-
tions,” like hours, schedule, physical surroundings, or potential hazards.  See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 652.210(11) (2017). 
 399.  See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5 (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A (2018); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 652.220(2)(2017). 
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Clearly, then, even under a “substantially similar” or “comparable” 
work threshold standard, many plaintiffs’ claims of unequal pay will—and 
should—still fail.  Plaintiffs whose comparators perform job duties that are 
more complex or require greater responsibility, or whose employers value 
and pay more for additional job-related education or experience, or who fail 
to provide evidence to meet their prima facie proof of comparability will not 
be helped by this legal change.  The move from “equal” to a “comparable” 
or “substantially similar” work standard is an incremental advance that does 
not open Pandora’s Box to equalizing pay between all men and women.  In-
stead, it refocuses the inquiry on comparing job duties themselves ex ante, 
rather than comparing the people who hold the jobs and justifying potentially 
bias-infected pay ex post—to stop the pay-gap-magnifying trend of allowing 
any difference between comparators to justify disparate pay despite similari-
ties between their jobs. 
A final and, perhaps, the most significant advantage of a move to a 
standard of equal pay for “substantially similar” or “comparable” rather than 
“equal” work is the impact it stands to have on employer efforts to resolve 
unequal pay voluntarily.  As critics of a move toward a comparability stand-
ard may argue, a change in the law would allow more plaintiffs to succeed at 
the prima facie stage of an equal pay claim, creating additional litigation.  Yet 
the prospect of more lawsuits may, likewise, incentivize employers to exam-
ine their existing pay structures more closely.  This could, in turn, ultimately 
reduce litigation, given the robust affirmative defenses still available to em-
ployers who tie pay-setting to job-related factors.  In fact, new laws in both 
Massachusetts and Oregon create explicit incentives for employers to remedy 
their own pay disparities by providing partial defenses against state equal pay 
claims for such efforts.  Oregon law limits compensatory and punitive dam-
ages for employers who have conducted a reasonable, good-faith, and effec-
tive “equal-pay analysis” within three years prior to the filing of the relevant 
lawsuit.400  In Massachusetts, an employer’s similar “self-evaluation of its 
pay practices,” also conducted in good faith, in the prior three years, resulting 
in “reasonable progress” toward improvement can raise an affirmative de-
fense to liability under the statute.401 
Ultimately, a move to a threshold standard of “substantially similar” or 
“comparable” work allows courts to apply equal pay law—and employers to 
set pay—more consistently, fairly, and effectively, by focusing on job duties 
rather than job holders and on legitimate job-related differences rather than 
just any differences to justify pay disparities. 
                                                 
 400.  OR. REV. STAT.  § 652.210(4) (2017). 
 401.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A(d) (2018). 
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C.  Counterarguments and Considerations 
Arguments against broadening the reach of equal pay laws mirror skep-
ticism about the existence of gender and racial pay gaps in general.  The most 
common argument against the need to remedy the gender pay gap is that the 
gap reflects women’s own “choices.”402  Women prioritize shorter hours and 
flexibility to allow for family caregiving, the argument goes, so they choose 
to enter lower paid professions that demand fewer hours.  This, such critics 
suggest, is beyond the province of antidiscrimination law, and employers 
should not bear the financial burden for women’s choices: if occupational 
segregation is the problem, women choose to enter female-dominated occu-
pations. 
While it may be demographically accurate that women prefer to work 
fewer hours or seek out flexibility due to family obligations, women do not 
“choose” the economic disadvantage or professional marginalization that 
comes with working reduced hours.403  Were antidiscrimination law to force 
employers to look closely at comparable work, it is possible that the absolute 
correlation between high-hours demanding jobs and high pay may start to 
dissipate.  Moreover, taking a comparable work approach does not require 
pay parity for employees who work fewer hours; instead it seeks to correct 
underpayment of traditionally female jobs that are performed at the same 
level for the same hours.  While that means it will not completely close the 
pay gap, it may narrow it. 
Another powerful narrative against equal pay reforms is the market de-
fense,404 which holds particular sway in a legal framework that already af-
fords great deference to employers about how to run their businesses.  This 
argument claims that employers should not have to pay more to fill a position 
than the market requires.  In highly skilled positions, offering a higher salary 
is often the only way to recruit top talent.  If a woman agrees to take the same 
position at less pay, such critics suggest, the employer is not to blame. 
                                                 
 402.   See, e.g., Christina Hoff Sommers, The Wage Gap Myth Exposed——by Feminists, 
HUFFPOST (Jan 23, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/christina-hoff-sommers/wage-
gap_b_2073804.html; Lisa Annese, Dispelling the Myths: Why the Gender Pay Gap does not Re-
flect the ‘Choices’ Women Make, GUARDIAN (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/sustain-
able-business/2016/nov/08/dispelling-the-myths-why-the-gender-pay-gap-does-not-reflect-the-
choices-women-make. 
 403.  See, e.g., GOULD ET AL., supra note 11, at 3, 7, 21–22; JOAN C. WILLIAMS, JESSICA 
MANVELL & STEPHANIE BORNSTEIN, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE L., “OPT OUT” OR PUSHED OUT?: HOW 
THE PRESS COVERS WORK/FAMILY CONFLICT (2006), http://worklifelaw.org/pubs/OptOut-
PushedOut.pdf.  See generally Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 33 (examining choice arguments 
in response to workforce segregation under Title VII); Schultz & Petterson, supra note 33 (same); 
Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, supra note 33 (same).   
 404.  See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 40; Rabin-Margalioth, supra note 193, at 810. 
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The strongest response to this argument is that it is unfair and econom-
ically inefficient for employers to profit off of discrimination.  The whole 
point of antidiscrimination law is to correct for discrimination that the free 
market fails to redress.405  Pushing existing law to question bias-infected de-
cisions is exactly the type of incremental advancement that antidiscrimina-
tion law is designed to effect.  An incremental move to comparable work is 
not a radical departure from existing market principles: it still allows employ-
ers to recruit as they wish, they must just equalize pay going forward, so as 
to break the cycle of perpetual underpayment to women and racial minorities 
for equivalent work. 
A third counterargument is that, while closing pay gaps is a laudable 
ideal, it is unfair to employers to mandate anything more in law.  Where an 
employer can afford to equalize pay, it will do so voluntarily; forcing em-
ployers to do so otherwise is asking the business sector to pay for “societal” 
discrimination it did not create.406  Of course, voluntary efforts are warranted 
and encouraged, but they are clearly insufficient.  The gender and racial pay 
gaps have been stalled for nearly two and four decades respectively407; it is 
long overdue for equal pay law to be revived, to accomplish what it was in-
tended to do.  Moreover, given the decline in union density,408 only those 
with the most human capital and bargaining power will benefit when employ-
ers choose to correct pay gaps voluntarily.  This ignores the greatest potential 
benefit in closing the gender and racial pay gaps: improvements in income 
inequality for those at the bottom of the income spectrum. 
Certainly, a comparable work approach is not a panacea.  It cannot, 
alone, close the pay gaps.  It does not go as far as comparable worth, so it can 
only incrementally improve on the portion of the pay gaps due to occupa-
tional segregation.  This approach keeps comparisons within the employer 
and between similarly-difficult jobs.  It also does nothing to address the half 
or more of the pay gap that is due to demographic differences between 
women and men (temporal inflexibility, working hours) and between white 
and minority workers (differing access to education and work experience).  
Despite all of these caveats, however, it is time that the law moves beyond 
the outdated and myopic view that nothing can be done to improve pay equity 
unless the jobs in question are virtually identical.  Reframing “comparators” 
                                                 
 405.  See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 151–66 (1997); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination, 8 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 22 (1991). 
 406.  See Claire Suddath, Why Can’t Your Company Just Fix the Gender Wage Gap?, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 21, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/fea-
tures/2017-06-21/why-can-t-your-company-just-fix-the-gender-wage-gap (“Companies that are 
motivated to make these kinds of changes, or at least talk about the problem, are the exception.”). 
 407.  See supra notes 49, 64 and accompanying text. 
 408.  See supra notes 358–359 and accompanying text. 
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and “equal work” in current law and moving toward a standard of “substan-
tially similar” or “comparable work” in state law provides a commonsense 
and incrementally reasonable approach to push antidiscrimination law to do 
better to correct an economic injustice. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Recent economic research supports the conclusion that, no matter how 
finely you slice the data, there is a gender pay gap that remains,409 and that 
there is an even greater racial pay gap.410  Improvement in both pay gaps has 
been stalled for decades,411 and both pay gaps contribute to—and exacer-
bate—steep economic inequality in the United States.412  As the most recent 
data shows, up to one-half of both pay gaps are now due to discrimination, 
stereotyping, and occupational segregation,413 to which antidiscrimination 
law—not any expensive new social program or major new legislation—is 
properly addressed. 
Existing antidiscrimination law has failed to close the pay gaps and, left 
untouched to continue under existing court interpretations, may never do so.  
Both the antidiscrimination approach of federal Title VII414 and the labor 
code approach of the federal Equal Pay Act415  leave significant holes in the 
protections they offer to employees who experience pay discrimination.  As 
currently interpreted by federal courts, both Title VII’s “legitimate nondis-
criminatory reason” defense and the Equal Pay Act’s “any factor other than 
sex” defense excuse employer justifications for pay disparities that may be 
infected with bias, like prior salaries and the “market defense.”416  But an 
even more significant limitation of both statutes is the requirement that an 
employee alleging pay disparity be able to point to a nearly identical com-
parator who is paid more.  Courts have interpreted the “comparator require-
ment” in Title VII and the definition of “equal work” in the Equal Pay Act in 
unnecessarily narrow ways, circumscribing the reach of broader statutory 
language that offers the potential to create greater pay equity.417 
To move closer to closing the gender and racial pay gaps, existing law 
can and should be reinterpreted to reach and root out stereotypes about the 
value of the work performed by women and racial minorities.  Advances in 
                                                 
 409.  See supra notes 47–61 and accompanying text. 
 410.  See supra notes 62–73 and accompanying text. 
 411.  See supra notes 49, 64 and accompanying text. 
 412.  See supra Part I.C. 
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 414.  See supra Part II.A. 
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the law of stereotype theory418 and examples of employers who have volun-
tarily taken a wider view of what work should be paid equally419 provide new 
arguments for defining “equal work” under existing law more fairly. 
At the state level, existing law in seventeen states—and proposed legis-
lation in others—provide the opportunity for more far-reaching reform by 
requiring equal pay for men and women performing “similar” or “compara-
ble,” rather than “equal,” work.420  These statutes offer a chance to address 
more directly the challenge to pay equity posed by a U.S. workforce marked 
by steep occupational segregation by gender and race.421 
For decades, opponents of efforts to strengthen equal pay protections 
have argued that men’s and women’s jobs, like apples and oranges, cannot 
be compared,422 and the law has done little to correct this misperception.  But 
not every job is singular and unique; not every possible difference in posi-
tions need be pay-determinative.  Examples from the efforts of unionized 
workplaces, the federal government, and even equity-minded private em-
ployers to equalize pay423 make what is possible clear.  Antidiscrimination 
law can and should challenge unexamined stereotypes and biases that get 
mixed into legitimate bases for pay-setting, to provide a way to reach work-
force segregation and close the gender and racial pay gaps once and for all. 
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